Chapter 2:

The Development of National Tendencies in the Present Age

1.

More than any previous period in history, our age appears to be dominated by national drives, ideas, and conflicts. It appears to be a specifically modern movement which, beginning only at the dawn of the nineteenth century, from then on gaining unremittingly in power and strength and spreading across the entire globe, has today become the most elemental factor of political life. Indeed, what we call nationalism today had scarcely been known in this form in recorded human history before our own time. Similar phenomena existed at all times; previously, too, people clung to their homeland and their people, sacrificing their lives for their fatherland and state. Previously, too, there were racial enmities and racial wars, and previously the individual stood within supra-individual contexts of blood and culture.

But in earlier times these connections were never so purely and strongly pronounced; they frequently remained within the sphere of the unconscious and failed to find the stronger expression of consciousness—broadly speaking, because the people and the state had not yet found one another.

This finding of one another by people and state, the emergence of the nation and the nation-state, is the deepest event of modern history. In the Middle Ages, too, there were peoples and states. But for the most part, states led a life of their own just as peoples did. The individual was not a member of the state as a compatriot, nor a compatriot as a member of the state. Belonging to a state had little to do with belonging to a people. The individual was split between the two, and both stood in opposition to one another. This was the reason why a strong, unambiguous national tendency

could not develop. That only became possible when the soul of the people and the body of the state had found one another and that which we call the nation-state today came into being. One can say—if one surveys the post-antique development—that through the centuries people and state had sought each other and only realized in the previous century that they belong together and depend on one another like body and soul. Indeed, they are. But since they have different conditions of life, a different origin, and different development, it goes with them somewhat like man and wife, who are also dependent on each other yet can never fully understand one another. Therefore, it also took a long time until this marriage came about, and therefore it is nowhere entirely untroubled today.

The emergence of the nation-state signifies an immense upheaval for the relationship of individuals to the supra-individual bonds in which they stand. Two such bonds that formerly crossed paths have become one and attained immense power through this unity. The compatriot became a citizen of the state, the state became the external organization of the inner community which is called the people. The power that bound the individual to the blood and cultural context of the people, and the power that the external organization of the state possessed and claimed, united. The idea of the people could now make entirely different demands on the individual because it had the power of the state behind it; the state could double its demands because it could appeal to the idea of the people.

Thus arose what we call the national tendency today. Since its inception, it has constantly grown in strength and intensity and is still growing continuously. It has gripped all peoples around the globe, has not halted before states like Turkey and China, for which entirely different historical preconditions apply, and dominates political events everywhere. Transposed to the individual, this development can be expressed by saying that the individual is increasingly absorbed into the compatriot. The individual is less and less a true individual and more and more a member and representative of the nation.

This development is so self-evident, it is confirmed by such an evocative experience, that it is unnecessary to trace it in detail through the history of

individual peoples. If we nevertheless take examples from the history of individual peoples, we do so not to prove, but to illustrate and on this occasion to outline in what different ways the problem of national growth presents itself to the great peoples who are the subjects of world politics.

The war of the Balkan peoples against Turkey shows us the problem equally clearly from two sides: the will to live, the viability of the nation-states on the one hand, and the inability to live, the necessary decay of the European Turkey not built upon a national foundation on the other. It is said that King Ferdinand, as a cautiously weighing politician, did not want to wage the first war, and that he was pushed by the mood of the people and the army. He himself, in the undoubtedly justified consideration that the future would peacefully place in Bulgaria's lap everything it might gain through war, had wanted to avoid the loss of property and life and the risks of war. Perhaps a later historiography will realize that the king was right if he thought thus. The king had to wage the war; the people wanted the Macedonian brothers beyond the Rilo and Rhodope mountains liberated; and the elemental power of this will led to victory. Whoever reads the descriptions of these battles and ponders the enormous casualty figures—the Bulgarians lost around 30 percent of their army—stands astonished before the elemental violence of the national idea. Skeptical Europe, accustomed to look down upon these peoples with a mixture of pity and contempt, bowed before the impression. No one came up with the idea that a piece of the fruits of their victory could be withheld from the victors. People saw in the demands of the national idea a kind of divine will, recognized the right of the Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks to the territories inhabited by their compatriots; and where they contradicted, they did so to help another people, the Albanians, to their right to state existence. The argument with which the great powers haggled among themselves and with the Balkan states over the borders of this Albania was likewise taken from the circle of national ideas; it had always been a question of whether this or that border region was inhabited by a majority of Serbs and Greeks or of Albanians. Europe bowed so much to the power and inner right of the national tendency that it found little to reply against the methods by which national

majorities were created through murder and burning in disputed territories during this war. The first Balkan war was followed by the second, the war for the spoils. It merely confirmed and underlined the general lessons of the first. The spectacle of the two wars with their gruesome details of national hatred and elemental hostility shows how little the pale ideas of a cosmopolitan rationalism mean against the dark powers of human nature from which nationalism wells.

On the other side stood Turkey: it collapsed not through military accidents, but through moral flaws. Isolated heroism is in vain. The idea that makes heroes out of all was missing. The unifying force was missing. A disintegrating officers' corps, an army composed of various nationalities. The religious bond no longer sufficed; the young Turkey had weakened it by having begun to enlist Christians. The Turks had fought better earlier, presumably because the unifying idea was still more powerful and the nationalism opposing them had not yet grown to equal force. The nation-states triumphed over the mixture of peoples.

The growth of the national movement is also not uninvolved in the internal decomposition of Turkey. The Turkish state was a state based on force in which a jumble of races and peoples united only by religion was ruled through a highly developed despotic refinement by a thin stratum of military conquerors, the Turks. A revolution made possible by the influence of Western European ideas undertook to modernize this state, which by its nature was difficult to modernize, but in doing so—as development proved—shook the actual elements of its cohesion. First, the Young Turks attempted to unite the various peoples under the battle cry of reform and the banner of civilizing fraternization. When this failed, they attempted to consolidate an Ottoman national identity, an attempt that came to grief over the Albanian question. When the Entente libérale replaced the Young Turks in power, they attempted decentralization, for which it was too late. The stone had been set rolling, the national tendency once created, the religious bond loosened. We also find the national tendency among the factors of this development. In Asiatic Turkey, too, since the overthrow of the old regime, we see here and there a national

movement emanating from the educated classes under the influence of European views and slowly gaining a foothold, and we hear year by year more of a Syrian or an Arab independence movement. The rotten state seems to have tottered. Here and there a national movement, alien to its nature and living conditions, gnaws at its remains. Perhaps a later development will lead to the fact that, just as now in Europe, so later in Asia, all territories merely subjugated by the Ottomans, but not entirely inhabited by them, are repelled, Syria, Armenia, and Mesopotamia are lost, and only Asia Minor remains as the core of an Ottoman state built upon a national basis, though certainly scarcely viable. That an Ottoman nationalism is already in the making today is proven by the boycotts that have been attempted since 1908 against Austria-Hungary, Greece, and Italy, and which could not have partially succeeded without a national resonance of political reasons.

2.

Among the great modern cultural states, there is today only one that is not based on the unity of a people and is not a nation-state: Austria-Hungary. If one dates the beginning of the modern age to the discovery of the nation and its association with the concept of the state, the Austro-Hungarian state would stand alone within it as a relic of the Middle Ages. Indeed, its structural form is characteristic of the states of the Middle Ages insofar as in them, just as in Austria-Hungary, the unifying element was the dynasty and not the national. Today it is the sole exception and shows as such how new and powerful the movement is that created the nation-states. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy encompasses a colorful crowd of nationalities. Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, Poles, Slovenes, Croats, Italians, Ruthenians, Romanians. These peoples are united under the scepter of the House of Habsburg. What holds them together is the state organization and a dynastic loyalty cultivated over centuries with undoubted skill. Before the awakening of the national movement in the world, this colorful mixture was governed without extraordinary difficulty. In the middle of the previous century, the difficulties began. The House of Habsburg had to cede its German influence to Prussia, its Italian possessions to Piedmont,

and thus pay its tribute to the national movements that unfolded in these regions and could find no fulfillment of their will to live within the framework of the Austro-Hungarian state. Lombardy gravitated toward Piedmont; and against the natural power of this movement every artificial power was powerless. The Italian border districts that remained to the Austro-Hungarian dynasty still gravitate toward Italy today; and if the Trieste and Trentino irredentism—which admittedly causes ever-increasing difficulties for the internal politics of the monarchy—does not have the same significance for foreign policy as the former Lombard question, that lies not on the weakness of the national movement, but on the one hand on a series of political factors that brought the Kingdom of Italy and the Danubian Monarchy closer together, on the other hand on the small space of the disputed territories, whose population is moreover partly interspersed with elements of other nationality. Of the German possessions, the House of Habsburg retained its ancient ancestral lands, which are connected to the kindred ruling house through centuries of faithfully preserved memory like no other part of the monarchy. No centrifugal tendency dangerous to Austro-Hungarian policy has developed here; the reasons for this are to be sought in the particularistic character of the Germans and in the circumstance that the great majority of Austrian Germans are Catholic, the supreme power of the German Empire is Protestant Prussia. Moreover, the close friendship between the two states, which have stood shoulder to shoulder on all questions for nearly four decades, leaves no room for such a movement. If it is nonetheless said that the alliance of the two states rests not only on their interests, but also on the national sentiment of the Germans of Austria, and that an Austro-Hungarian government that oriented its policy against the German Empire would thereby fail to find the approval of the German population of the monarchy, the latent effectiveness of a national movement is recognized in this case too.

The growing national tendency has driven Austria-Hungary out of Germany and Italy. Since that time, coming to terms with the national tendency has become the true content of Austro-Hungarian politics. It has become increasingly difficult and is today simply the problem of politics.

The various nationalities that formerly lived side by side tolerably well under the scepter of Habsburg have become increasingly incompatible; everywhere conflicts have sharpened, points of friction multiplied. There is no end to the squabbling. The forms and means of struggle are also becoming sharper. Ever new questions arise, or in ever new variations the same question. And always nothing seems possible other than to bring about a solution through a compromise. In one or another of the parliaments of the Dual Monarchy, there is always some national obstruction, now in the Bohemian diet of the Czechs or Germans, now in the Hungarian parliament of the Croats or Romanians, now in the Austrian imperial council of the Slovenes, Ruthenians, Italians. And for years the newspapers of the monarchy have had daily opportunities to busy themselves with some accommodation.

Thus, precisely because it is not a nation-state, the internal politics of Austria-Hungary is the most compelling example of the potency of the national movement that has seized the world. The fact is so undeniable that for our purposes it is unnecessary to linger on the details of this spectacle. That the central problem of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy also dominates its entire foreign policy, and that in this dependence the reason for a certain immobility and passivity of this policy is to be sought, for this the development of the Balkan crisis of the year 1913 offers striking proof. Austria-Hungary could, if it felt the urge for activity and expansion within itself and considered itself capable of expansion, without difficulty use one of the opportunities yielded by this war to secure for itself the Sanjak of Novibazar and thus a growing influence on Balkan affairs, perhaps a future mortgage on the road to Salonica. It did not do so, but declared itself saturated in the year 1908 upon the annexation of Bosnia. It never harbored serious plans for this much-discussed route and never felt that famous drive toward the East. After the occupation of Bosnia, it built the Bosnian railways single-track and narrow-gauge, thereby already showing that an expansion of this acquisition toward the south was far from its mind. It limited itself in 1913 to preventing the emergence of a Greater Serbia by rejecting Serbian claims to a piece of the Adriatic coast and compensating

for the enlargement of Serbia through the creation of an Albania necessarily hostile to Serbs. This motive, too, is connected with the central problem of Austro-Hungarian politics. Austrian newspapers justified the stance of the monarchy in the question of Serbian claims to the Adriatic coast on the grounds that the existence of a viable Greater Serbia was threatening to the monarchy because then the Austro-Hungarian parts of the country inhabited by Serbs, first and foremost Bosnia and Herzegovina, would gravitate toward this Serbian nation-state just as the Lombardy once gravitated toward Piedmont. Nothing can be objected to this political argument. The opponents of the foreign policy of the Danubian Monarchy raise the question of whether this argument should not have induced Austro-Hungarian policy to prevent the present enlargement of Serbia as well, namely the emergence of the Serbian-Montenegrin border; and only the future, which will show whether the monarchy is capable of preventing the unification of the two kindred and now bordering countries in every case, can answer such a question.

The growth of national tendencies and thus of centrifugal forces in Austria-Hungary makes the Austro-Hungarian question an international problem of the future in many eyes. Many who are not familiar with the country's peculiarity predict an early decay under the impression of national disputes. The question of what is to become of Austria-Hungary seems to lie like a nightmare over the future of Europe. The possibility that future entanglements, perhaps an unfortunate war, might prove these fears right and make the problem—still latent for international politics—acute cannot of course be denied. Those, however, who see in the rising nationalism an internal decomposition process that must bring about an early decay even without external fates, overlook an essential factor. The dynastic bond alone would scarcely have sufficed to hold the motley mixture of peoples together as a state even to the present day. Other factors must act in a centripetal direction. These are, firstly, the special interests of an economic, ideal, and political nature that bind a large mass of individuals belonging to the most diverse nationalities to the unity of the state. But not only special interests of a personal kind are linked with the existence of the monarchy,

but also the interests of the peoples united under it as peoples. Individuals of these nationalities would mean nothing without the monarchy, would not be able to maintain themselves as national existences without it. That is the case, for example, of the Poles. It is to a certain degree also the case of the Hungarians. It is the case of the Czechs. For all of them, the existence of a great power Austria-Hungary is a condition of national existence. To that extent, the intensification of the national will to live of the individual nationalities is not directed against the existence of the monarchy. Indeed, one can say that the monarchy finds its strongest and most reliable support precisely in the will to live of the nationalities themselves, indeed the existence of the overall state first enables the individual nationalities to unfold and preserve themselves in mutual quarreling without the risk of personal harm. Upon this peculiar relationship rests the tenacious vitality of this state, which is passive by nature, and it may well be that diplomats yet unborn will still admire and marvel at this tenacity in a distant future.

3.

The greatest Russian and most profound representative of Russian nationalism, F. M. Dostoevsky, said of Russia: "We Russians are a young people, we are only beginning to live, although we are already a thousand years old, but a large ship also needs deep navigable water." It is not easy for the Western European to grasp the essence of Russian nationalism and through such grasping to assess what development possibilities this nationalism has and what forces are hidden in the Pan-Slavic din that sounds discordantly to our ears from the northeast. Russian patriotism is something quite peculiar. It contains elements and nuances for which the modern European has no real feel. Above, we reproduced a passage from Dostoevsky's "The Devils" concerning the people and their religious faith, which is perhaps the deepest and most compelling formulation of the national tendency in world literature. It is characteristic that this formulation stems from the pen of a Russian. First, there is in Russian nationalism the unconditional belief in Russia, the Russian people, and its world-redeeming mission. No reflection on any grievances of today's Russia can touch this unconditional belief in any way. That comes from the

fact that the Russian believes rock-solidly in the eternity of Russia. Russia is young, it has only just begun to live, it has not at all shown what it can do; what do all grievances matter then? "Russia and the Church," says Friedrich Nietzsche in an aphorism of his posthumous works, "can wait." The genius has pronounced in these short words a profound proposition almost fundamental for the understanding of Russia and Russian politics. This conviction of the immense time available for Russian development underlies Russian phlegm. This conviction is built upon the awareness of the immense space occupied by the Russian Empire. The Russian peasant stands behind his plow and looks into the infinite plain that bears the infinite sky, and all of that is Russia. It is the sky of the Russian God, it spans the world. And the Tsar rules everywhere. Indeed, more than all peoples of the present, the Russian people has reason to believe in its eternity. The immense mass has enormous weight; no blow from outside can shake it. The Russian Empire can lose battles, provinces can be rent from it: what does that signify? Russia is so big that all of Russia still remains. It has time, it can reconquer the provinces. Napoleon I conquered all the other empires of the continent and brought them close to ruin; he advanced as far as Moscow, but the immense expanse of Holy Russia overcame him too. Indeed, all other peoples of Europe must more or less reckon with the possibility of their downfall. The Russian alone can refuse even to discuss such a possibility.

This Russian belief in Russia has a very strong religious imprint. The wide Russian plain, the Russian sky, the Russian God, the Tsar—all of this forms a unity. The belief in Russia is the belief in God; Russia is the world, and the God of the orthodox is the God of the world. Russian nationalism rests upon these sentiments of the Russian peasant. It was naturally always alive in these sensations. But as the naive, half-conscious belief of the peasant, it was politically never very active—unless it happened to be about the cross on the Hagia Sophia—because the belief in the eternity of Russia and the phlegm springing from it lay heavy upon him.

From the middle of the previous century, the time of the Crimean War, thus around the same time when the national movement also awoke in the

other countries, this latent nationalism gradually began to become conscious of itself. The Pan-Slavic movement set in, which would better be called the Old Russian movement. Initially, of course, as a movement of educated classes. As such, it has constantly increased in extent and intensity since the middle of the previous century. It is also today, insofar as it is conscious and actively asserts itself, a movement of the educated classes. The typical Russian Pan-Slav is not—or not yet—the Russian peasant. But Pan-Slavism rests upon the broad shoulders of the Russian peasant, in whom it is latent and can be awakened by events. The more this nationalism steps out of the sphere of the unconscious into the sphere of the conscious, the more active it will become and the more it will lose that phlegmatic passivity that today still lies like a veil over the actions of the broad strata of the Russian people. That phlegm no longer clings to the modern Pan-Slavism of the intellectuals: they are seized by the same nervous will to live that dominates Europe. The more Russia moves into the European mode of perception, the more active and conscious Russian nationalism will become; it will perhaps lose much of its religious depth, but also much of its mystical phlegm. Modern Pan-Slavism has the airs of a hysterical suggestion; but it would be wrong to think it exhausted by such an evaluation. All these gestures and this din are merely the foam on the crest of the wave; the wave goes deep and rolls slowly, steadily growing, toward land. Once the entire mass of the Russian people becomes conscious of its nationalism, then the world will see the most powerful movement in scale and unspent intensity. As is known, the German government justified its recent extraordinary army reinforcement with the growth of Pan-Slavism. The German Reichskanzler has spoken of this growth with an openness rarely seen among leading statesmen. He has spoken of the Pan-Slavic screamers, but undoubtedly meant the deeper Russian nationalism, and the military precautions are only understandable through such a deeper assessment of the pan-Russian movement as a danger to Germany's future.

Of particular interest is the relationship of specifically Russian nationalism to proper Pan-Slavism, that is, the Slavic unity movement. Both

movements appear conceptually distinct, and yet in reality they appear in close linkage, indeed as one and the same movement. The Pan-Slavism of the Russians is to be separated from the Pan-Slavism of the non-Russian Slavs. For the Russian, it is the idea of Russian leadership over all Slavs. They are all children of the great mother Russia, who has to protect them, but also to steer them. Russian Pan-Slavism is thus nothing other than Russian nationalism, whose expansiveness expresses itself in it. It has nothing else in view than the expansion of Russian rule to the non-Russian Slavs; the fraternization of which it speaks is incorporation. The Russian idea is broadened into a Slavic idea, but the Russian idea is not to be absorbed into the Slavic one; rather, the Slavic idea is to be absorbed into the Russian. The Pan-Slavism of the non-Russian Slavs is something different. For them it is no further than the right and claim to Russian help. Serbs are Pan-Slavs because they are politically not viable without leaning on a great power and must constantly claim Russian help against Austria-Hungary. The Bulgarians are so as long as they are pressed and endangered by non-Slavic states like Turkey or Romania and have an interest in Russian policy taking them under its wing. The manifesto that King Ferdinand issued at the beginning of the Turkish War was calculated in every word for Pan-Slavic and orthodox ears. That, however, is not the expression of Pan-Slavic sentiments of the Bulgarian nation, but a political mask conditioned in the particular political constellation. Whoever is not deceived by these disguises has been able to observe for some time, precisely in the Bulgarian case, that real development runs quite differently. After the first war, Bulgaria had wrestled down its principal adversary, Turkey, and made motions of being able to dispense with the Russian shield. It seemed to want to shed a piece of the Pan-Slavic constraint one by one; in sharp contrast to Pan-Slavism, a purely Bulgarian nationalism seemed to arise that wants nothing to do with a unification of all Slavs under Russian supremacy. Even before the youngest war, Bulgarian politics has emancipated itself more and more from Russian tutelage; during the war and especially at the peace negotiations, the exploitation of Pan-Slavic sentiments of Russian public opinion by the Bulgarians did not prevent the

Russian government from fighting Bulgarian claims to the coast of the Sea of Marmara. The Bulgarian envoys dispatched to Petersburg, the President of the Chamber, Dr. Danew, and the glory-crowned General Radko Dimitrew, were indeed received by the Pan-Slavs with noisy jubilation, but could push nothing through with the government of all that for the sake of which they undertook the journey. Already the Russian position on the eventuality of a Bulgarian breakthrough of the last Turkish defense lines and thus a Bulgarian entry into Constantinople clearly shows that around Constantinople and the cross on the Hagia Sophia a Russian-Bulgarian conflict wanted to arise, before whose inner logic Pan-Slavism would have had to bow.

Bulgaria, although a creature of Russian policy, seemed to have grown too large; Russian policy must wish that the protégés do not outgrow the shoe. For this movement is an instrument of Russian expansion. Therein Russian Pan-Slavism reveals itself as Russian nationalism, and precisely thereby it characterizes the essence of nationalism in general.

When then during the second Balkan war Slavs stood against Slavs, there was also no longer any Pan-Slavic disguise for Russian policy—and under the impression of events, the Pan-Slavic speakers had to fall silent for some time.

Russia's relationship to the Slavic Balkan states is highly instructive for a theoretically ungemein complicated question of high practical importance: for the question of the conditions of origin of nations, the principles governing their division and unification. We started from nations as organisms and treated them as fixed givens; reflection on practical problems, however, presents us here and there with the question of whether a new nation can arise here, whether an already existing one will be able to be fused with another there. The assessment of these possibilities is of the greatest weight for practical political calculation. It is of decisive importance, for example, for judging today's British colonial policy and the possibilities of the future Greater Britain. We mention the difficult problem at this point in order to designate it as a problem, but cannot deal with it more thoroughly within this framework.

This peculiarity of Russian nationalism, in union with the space-political factors of the Russian Empire, condition the character of its expansion drive. The Russian Empire encompasses the greater half of Europe like the greater half of Asia; land thus it has enough. But both Asian and European Russia lack one thing: free access to the south and its ice-free seas. It is toward these regions that Russian longing is directed. It is as if the immense mass were slowly setting itself in motion. In the west Constantinople, in Central Asia the Persian Gulf, in the east the ice-free ports of China. In the east it was thrown back by the war with Japan, in the west it has not progressed thus far. In Central Asia it has laid its hand on northern Persia. In Mongolia it has advanced by a large piece in recent times. There is something in this movement like a law of the great mass that grows through its own center of gravity because something must accrue to it from all sides. But this movement is laden with all of Russian phlegm, the enormous available time. This expansion nowhere concerns vital questions of life that must be solved today because tomorrow is too late. There is generally no "too late" yet for this empire. The actual vital questions lie within. Their difficulty has weighed palpably upon the expansiveness of Russian policy since the coincidence of the Japanese War with the Russian Revolution.

It has often been noted that the remarkable colonizing successes that Russia has achieved in its Asian expansion area rest on a kinship of the Russian and Asian essences. This view may contain something correct, but it does not hit the essential. The successes of Russian colonization consist in the fact that the newly acquired territories in Asia fit into Russian rule without difficulty. The most important reason for this is to be found in the fact that the Russian colonizer generally leaves everything as it was, thus performs no active colonization work. The manner of Russian colonization is herein directly opposed to the English, which has brought about rapid and astonishing upheavals everywhere with high activity. That very phlegm and patience that characterize the Russian essence also weigh upon the manner of Russian colonization.

4.

After Italy achieved national unity in the second half of the previous century, following a millennium and a half of internal disunity, the nationalist movement might initially have seemed sated. Its goal—the unity of the nation-state—had been achieved. Conditions within the country were poor. There was plenty of work to be done at home; the immense tasks awaiting solution seemed likely to leave neither the strength nor the time for a nationalism directed outward. It should not be denied that modern Italy had accomplished much and made progress, and that its economic growth and financial consolidation were astonishing achievements. Yet in the south, entire provinces were falling into desolation, although their fertile soil could sustain and support a vigorous population; and the enormous emigration of the best of the workforce had its roots in the economic conditions and agrarian relations of southern Italy. Despite all the problems burdening the country's internal development and all the tasks still to be completed, Italian nationalism increasingly turned outward. Far from being sated, it had grown steadily throughout the four decades since Italy's unification. Here, too, we see an elemental movement. Italy had to abandon its aspirations in Tunisia and suffered a palpable setback in the Abyssinian War; yet the failures that had weighed heavily on national sentiment for decades could not suppress the people's vital drive. The pressure on the nation lifted when it embarked passionately on the Tripolitanian campaign and brought it to a successful conclusion. It is now clear that this war was forced not by the government's deliberations but by the people's drive for expansion. At the outset of the war, some European observers asked whether it was necessary or prudent, and whether Italy would not have done better to spend on its southern provinces only half the amount the war had cost, since those provinces were worth many times more than Tripolitania. National passion rejected this way of framing the question; the thought that Tripoli might fall into someone else's hands if Italy did not seize it was enough to convince every Italian that the war was necessary. Europe watched in astonishment and approved the outcome. Anyone who followed Italian journalism at the time would have been

struck by the impressive strength and unanimity of feeling—and, indeed, by the reality of a much broader, boundless dream. The ordinary man justified Italy's claims to Tripoli by invoking the legacy of the Roman Empire, to which Tripoli had once belonged; here and there, a Pan-Italianism also emerged, claiming mastery of the Mediterranean.

It is in the nature of nationalism to set its goals ever further and never halt anywhere. By definition it is insatiable. National unity does not suffice for it. It wants to extend and expand it without intermission.

Italian development is a testimony to a property of modern nationalism that we also encounter in other countries: it is extensive. It seems less concerned with deepening, with a growing intensity of culture, than with expansion. It seems to tend to neglect the one dimension of unfolding, the intensive, for the sake of the other, the extensive. Let us remember the parable of the tree, we could say that the tree strives more to extend its branches than to drive its roots deep into the earth. In intensity Italian nature has gained little.

In the economic development of modern Italy, the type of the returning emigrant plays a major role. The poor Italian emigrates and seeks to acquire a small fortune in North America or Argentina through decades of hard work and a frugal life. He returns and buys himself somewhere in his poorer and therefore cheaper homeland a little piece of land that nourishes him and his children. It is not exceptions, but the majority of Italian emigrants who act this way. The economic upswing and regeneration of modern Italy owe infinitely much to this habit. It has its root in an ineradicable love of home innate to every Italian. Thus, in time, the national will to live of the people will also heal in the south the wounds that the sins of the past have struck into economic life.

5.

Italy grows, cannot nourish its children, and demands growing space for the growing population. Here it might still seem as though the multiplication of the population were the driving factor of national expansion. Certainly population growth plays an immense role for the national drive, but it can

under no circumstances be addressed as its cause. Modern France is in the opposite position. For several decades now, it has viewed with painful sensations the fertility rate sinking and must state that if medical art did not succeed in increasing average life expectancy, the number of Frenchmen would not only remain the same, but decline. In this circumstance modern France states a fundamental fact of its development, a destiny of its future. People have debated the causes of this development in various ways and proposed manifold means of remedy, but have been unable to believe in a sweeping efficacy for any of them. One stands before an elemental fact. But has the national will to live therefore lost intensity and passion?

The foreign, yet objective observer who strives to survey the situation of modern France as a whole, seeing that in the struggles of the present all those forces are still at work that created a great future and are today striving around a future that it will no longer be able to create, cannot remain free from either shock or admiration. France once led the continent; it ruled Italy and Germany, decided the political destiny of Europe, and could raise the claim that its culture was the culture of the world. It was never quite able to push through its will to world dominance, and after many failures has set out anew time and again and placed the greatest demands upon itself. It has proven incomparable elasticity. Under Richelieu, it favored Germany's self-tearing-apart through political art and effortlessly ruled the once superior neighbor, under Louis XIV it waged bloody wars for its power claims concerning neighboring countries up to economic and military exhaustion and ultimately pushed through the greater part of these claims with tenacity; it laid its hand on the New World and would have been able to keep it if an insatiable thirst for power had not simultaneously embroiled it in German wars. The collapse of its North American claims (the capture of Quebec by the English in September 1759) was caused by its participation in the Seven Years' War. "We have conquered Canada in Germany," said the elder Pitt. Without the insatiability of French power policy guided by passion, but not by cool and carefully weighing reason, the New World would have a different

appearance. France lost its colonial empire then and in the Napoleonic Wars and yet has created a new one on other soil today.

It seemed to wish to bleed itself in internal struggles during the Revolution, seemed weakened, impoverished, and devastated. An elemental process of decomposition was in full development. Then the princes of Europe, who saw their legitimacy threatened, committed the folly of wanting to interfere in internal developments. The exhausted country rose up and accomplished from the first coalition war to the Battle of Waterloo one of the most astonishing feats of vital energy that history knows. It won back rule over Europe once more; and once again, in all likelihood, it would have been able to hold this rule for a considerable time if, in place of that insatiable greed for power embodied in Napoleon, the cool and wiser power-will of Talleyrand had guided it. After the third coalition war, Talleyrand had submitted a plan of European power distribution to Napoleon which, with the peaceful means of Richelieu's policy, might have been maintained and secured for France permanent possession of all conquests and hegemony over Europe. If Napoleon did not listen, it was probably not only the temperament of his character, but also the insight that his rule in France itself could not maintain itself without continuous sacrificial festivals prepared for national passion.

The history of the French Revolution proves precisely how easily the national life-drive can cast itself into a cosmopolitan garb and how little such a disguise signifies against the inner essence that always breaks through again in every important matter. The ideas that brought forth and sustained the French Revolution are purely cosmopolitan. There is no seeing why the sovereign validity of the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity should halt at national borders. On the basis of Rousseau's theory of the state, there is no place for the concept of the nation. And yet in the debates of the National Assembly and the Convention, in the clubs of the Jacobins and Girondins, no other concept had such a living significance, no other word proved such a magic power as "La France". From the deeper essence, an elemental force of nature forced its way to the light through all conceptual edifices. The idea of the republic, the principles of liberty,

equality, and fraternity became under its influence instruments of French world domination. France liberated the small neighboring peoples all around and surrounded itself first with a system of republics that later became satrapies of the Napoleonic dynasty. In the one role as in the other, it was nothing other than an integrating component of French world domination. The theoretical consequence of its principles should have seduced the men of the Convention to free trade; in praxi, in contrast to the final decades of the ancien régime, they pursued a strongly national protective tariff policy.

The country recovered surprisingly quickly from all external and internal struggles. It had lost its colonial empire and laid the foundation of a new one in July 1830 with the conquest of Algiers. We see it under Napoleon III reaching out once more for European hegemony, entangled in Italian and German bickering with the claim to rule both countries by the means of politics. When Napoleon III was then first diplomatically defeated by Bismarck and France was subsequently completely beaten down militarily by the rising Germany and lost two of its best provinces, it proved, contrary to the expectations of most, once again the same vitality. It has been said several times in Germany in recent decades that in fixing the war indemnity, the performance capacity of France had been underestimated and the mistake had been made of demanding only five billion francs instead of twenty billion. Indeed, France was able to raise the sum, enormous for ideas of that time, astonishingly quickly. There is probably no greater recognition of the vitality of the French people to be thought of than the indirect one that Bismarck demonstrated through his policy toward the defeated country. The great chancellor considered it necessary, in order to divert France's thoughts from Alsace-Lorraine, to support the expansive colonial policy of the Third Republic to the best of his ability and to provide France with employment and compensation in a great African colonial empire. The correctness of this Bismarckian policy is doubted in many ways from the standpoint of New German world policy and today's German colonial interests. Bismarck, so it is said, was still entirely caught up in purely European politics, and possessed no sense for

the necessity of a colonial world policy. Be that as it may—let us assume, since he himself pursued colonial policy later, that he possessed this sense denied to him; he probably would not have acted otherwise toward France. He wanted to consolidate the new German Empire first and valued the French danger highly enough to concede for its sake that more than a third of Africa would be closed economically and politically to German interests. Had he considered the great power France destroyed, he would probably have acted differently, even with complete disregard for colonial policy.

Only in connection with these historical and national memories can the political problem of modern France be formulated and understood. Since that time, much has changed inside and outside French borders. Internal politics seems dominated by the spirit of affairism, a spectacle in which personal ambition, vanity, and material interest play the main role; idealism, enthusiasm, and the grand gestures of the past seem alive only in the words used by business politicians and to be little more than a pompous rhetorical disguise. Formerly leading industry has lagged far behind that of other countries for lack of activity and daring, and cautious thrift has taken the place of creative enterprise. The French variety of the homo oeconomicus bears the traits of the anxious rentier.

If all this were true not for the surface, but for the depth of the French essence, if the peculiarity of the modern Frenchman were exhausted by such a characterization, the sources from which the past achievements of the nation flowed would have dried up; we would face not only a decline of national viability, but also a slackening of the national will to live. The essence of peoples cannot be characterized so easily and superficially. The plumb line must be lowered further. The surface of political life proves less than is commonly assumed. The psychological assessment of the individual, too, cannot answer the question from the description of external life as to what this or that human being is still capable of under these or those circumstances. And peoples are even more unfathomable than humans.

Internal disruption and corruption were worse in the France of earlier centuries on repeated occasions than today; and yet in the same times the people repeatedly rallied to such astonishing achievements. Things also

looked bad for the Prussia of 1807; and yet the people broke loose in 1813. One often imagines forces dried up that slumber in the depths and merely await opportunity, the idea, the leader who calls them.

Now there is proof of a real internal drying up of life-force: that is the decline of births, the inexorable annual memento of statistics. This memento is all the more serious and bitter for the Frenchman because the loss in numbers cannot be made up for by anything regarding military power against an opponent who can compete in the quality of soldiers and cannons. In 1870, the populations of France and the German Empire were equal. Today France reaches the population of Prussia, which today counts just as many people as the Germany of 1870. With an annual population growth of 850,000, the German Empire will have twice as many inhabitants as France around 1925–30. No one can evade the logic of such figures.

What characterizes the spirit of modern France, however, is the energy with which the nation rejects the death sentence that can be read from these figures. The fight against these figures, which rears up against their memento—the will to live of the nation: that is more important for the characterization of modern France than corruption, internal disruption, and affairism. Here the living forces of the depths become visible. The average Reichsgerman's judgment of modern France misses the mark precisely on this point. This judgment is composed roughly of the following elements: first, from the impression of the figures and the confident awareness of unstoppably growing numerical superiority, where part is justified and part is the worship of quantity characteristic of modern Germany; second, from the overestimation of the significance of internal grievances for the life-force and performance capacity of a people, failing to take into account that a kind of corruption that would mean the end of all communal spirit in Germanic countries is calmly borne by Romance countries and has been at home there at all times; third, from the valuation of French rhetoric as external and mendacious phrasemaking and the reinterpretation of enthusiasm into vanity, overlooking the fact that only for the Germanic, but not for the Romance mentality, rhetorical form is an objection to inner

truthfulness. If we evade the temptation of these elements, we have a clear view of the spectacle of an overall heroic struggle that the unbroken will to live of a great nation wages against declining viability.

Despite the defeat of 1870, the loss of prestige it entailed, and the severe wounds struck by the war, the forty years of the Third Republic have not become a time of external decline and decay. France possesses the second-largest colonial empire in the world today. Its political aspirations are no smaller: it still pursues a world policy of the grandest scale. Its political activity is unbroken; we encounter its claims and influences in all questions of world policy. It has not disowned its interest in either the Far or the Near East, has not forgotten its Syrian plans, has not ceased to dream of a leading role in the Mediterranean, and even today seems hardly saturated colonially, although with a declining population figure it hardly needs colonies. It still has the same ambition for diplomatic leadership: and even if the ratio of its real power to that of the other great powers is no longer sufficient for such leadership, the nation's drive for political standing is so strong that the statesmen of the republic, in order to maintain themselves, are forced to satisfy the ambition of the nation with the semblance of such leadership. This necessity has proven to be an essential characteristic of French politics in recent decades and has played an essential role here and there in the history of diplomatic negotiations. The national drive for standing has adapted itself to changed possibilities of unfolding with astonishing flexibility. The world position for which France once struggled with the means of war and violence, it seeks to conquer today through the power of capital placed in the service of national policy. Upon this, more than upon a valuation as the second-strongest military power in Europe, rests the greater part of its significant influence in Turkey, the Balkan countries, and Russia. We are not faced here with the blind, mechanical effect of a capital surplus that happens to exist and screams for interest, but with the astonishing cohesiveness of a national will to standing that forces the political utilization of this capital screaming for interest. To this, particularly in the last decade, another kind of world-political expansion, little noticed in Germany, has been added: the cultural. France possessed

the cultural leadership of the world in its great period. To half the world, the French essence passed as the model. Through the rise of Germany and the extension of English rule over a quarter of the inhabited world, France's cultural preeminence was significantly restricted, even if not broken in many areas.

Modern France is not satisfied with this development, but pursues a systematically organized cultural expansion of the grandest scale, to which no other state can place anything similar at its side. All branches of culture are placed in the service of this expansion. Leading scholars and writers are sent by the organizations entrusted with this expansion to give lectures in those countries upon whose cultivation special emphasis is placed. These are the small European countries: Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, the Scandinavian states, and South America. The successes of this propaganda are significant. It is constantly expanded. It is thoroughly in the service of politics. The reputation and standing of France are its goal. It represents a modern extension of political means of struggle that testifies equally to the activity of the French spirit and its vitality.

The most compelling of all testimonies, however, is the fact and manner of the persistence of the Alsace-Lorraine question. This question is formally settled. France formally renounced the two provinces in the Peace of Frankfurt. Nevertheless, this dead question—which has probably never been the subject of any discussions or negotiations between German and French statesmen since the Peace of Frankfurt—indirectly dominates the central problem of French politics, relations with Germany, and through them all of French policy. France has not forgotten hitherto and will not forget as long as it lives. Its intellect will perhaps always reject the idea of a war with which its imagination will always play, because the risk is too great, or because the leading men of the republic, who have to decide on war and peace, must reckon with the fact that a lost war as well as a won war equally endangers the republican form of state. Thus one will perhaps never act, perhaps even in times of danger publicly not even speak of the Alsace-Lorraine question, and yet always think of it and make of it, half consciously, half unconsciously, the pivot of all politics. From the

standpoint of political reason and cool weighing of given possibility, this is perhaps an absurd and fruitless standpoint: it is the indomitable will to live that forbids reason to draw correct but painful conclusions from the given situation. It is possible that cooperation with Germany would be more useful for the overall interests of French foreign policy than the policy currently pursued, in which the contrast with the German neighbor brings the republic into a dependence on Russian policy that is harmful to French interests in many points, which policy Russia knows how to exploit with skill. This dependence on Russia has become increasingly accentuated in the last decade. In questions concerning Russia, France has increasingly refrained from pursuing any French interests that might run counter to Russian interests. This came to light particularly in the safeguarding of its economic interests in the Near and Far East, here in its interests as a creditor of Turkey, there in its stance on the question of the six-power loan to China. Its policy is spellbound by the Alsace-Lorraine question. Thanks to the nation's incomparable will to power, it is simply the question.

The nationalist literature of modern France designates the present state of Europe as Germany's hegemony. Behind this expression, which scarcely reflects the actual situation correctly, hides the regret over France's lost hegemony, which from old memory counts for every Frenchman as the natural and righteous condition.

In sum: In France too, despite the decline in the birth rate and sinking real power, nationalism has not diminished. If around the turn of the century, under the influence of a materialistic wave sweeping across all countries, it so appeared, nationalism has since that time increased again in the intensity of its expressions and the sustainability of its sentiments; the young generation has fallen prey to it, the ideological current that replaced the materialism of enjoyment and whose most significant expression is the philosophy of Henri Bergson is carried by it and nourishes it through the philosophical expression it lends it. Contrary to German doubts, the country took upon itself the heavy sacrifice of three years of military service without extraordinary resistance appearing. From the discussion preceding this decision, it emerges clearly with what energy the country defends itself

against the consequence of numerical development, against the necessity of admitting its own weakness, and if anything, this striving demonstrates the inexhaustibility of the will to live that dominates this nation.

6.

The most important result of the last two centuries for politics and the primary fact of the contemporary world-political constellation is England's world domination. How it came about in detail cannot concern us here. We have to ask after the peculiarity and intensity of the political will that sustains it today. In it, however, the past continues to act, of which it is the heir.

The British Empire, the most extensive that history knows, the only one that ever spanned the globe and gained a foothold in all parts of the world, has grown in the last three centuries, now slower, now faster; on the whole it has experienced only one essential setback, the defection of those settlements from which today's United States arose, but has quickly caught up even with this: its development testifies to a marvelous consistency and sureness of aim. The factors of its emergence are today still the factors of its preservation and as such the basis of past, present, and presumably any future English policy. These factors are simple: they are the command of the seas, and that condition of continental Europe that we are accustomed to designate as the continental balance. These two factors give English policy a simple and uniform character that it has always preserved in the course of the centuries under externally changing conditions, and whose principles unconsciously but all the more unshakeably determine the political thinking of every Englishman. England has fought and defeated all sea-mighty peoples one after another, destroyed all fleets that it could somehow get hold of in war and in peace, and, as far as it could, sought to prevent the emergence of new ones. In the sixteenth century it destroyed the Armada of Philip II, in the seventeenth the fleet of the Dutch, in the Napoleonic wars one after another: in 1793 a French fleet at Toulon, in 1797 at St. Vincent a Spanish one, in the same year at Camperdown a Dutch one, in 1798 at Abukir a French one, off Naples a Neapolitan one,

in 1799 the remainder of the Dutch, in 1801 a Danish one, in 1805 at Trafalgar the Franco-Spanish, in 1807 through the raid on Copenhagen the Danish. During the same wars it destroyed all non-English arsenals, shipyards, ports, and sluices that could become dangerous or serve for the creation of new fleets. According to English figures, during the Napoleonic wars the English captured 260 large and 980 small warships and brought in annually between 2,500 and 4,000 merchant ships from 1801 to 1812, which were enlisted as seaworthy into the English fleet. They did this in defense against Napoleon I; but this defense procured them absolute rule at sea, the world trade monopoly, and an immense world empire. Just as France's hostility toward Frederick the Great delivered up to the Englishmen the Canada that was French until then, so the disruption of continental Europe in the times of Napoleon delivered up the French, Dutch, and Spanish colonies to the Englishmen. In all these struggles the Englishmen were the only winners. On March 25, 1807, Dundas said in the House of Commons: "Next to the destruction of the enemy's sea power, it was the best policy we could follow that we took possession of their settlements." Fox replied: "Was then the taking of islands the purpose of the war? Our purpose was to protect Europe against France!" The country was for the government. The opposition, had it been in power, would scarcely have acted differently. Already in 1793 a third of India, which was French at the time, fell into the hands of England, in the same year the French establishments in the West Indies, in 1796 the Cape Colony and the Dutch possessions in India, then Spanish Trinidad, and so on.

What created the British Empire, however, was not primarily all these deeds of violence, not the military victories. Admittedly, without the victorious battles at Abukir and Trafalgar all this would not have been possible. But even with these and even more brilliant victories, without the spirit dominating these islanders, without an abnormal political talent and without a rare mixture of political suppleness and energy, the work that we admire today would not have been possible. It is to a much higher degree a work of diplomacy than of arms. The military history of other countries is

richer in brilliant victories, heroic deeds. What England has ahead of other states are not the victories, but the good consequences of its victories. These, however, are a work of politics.

Every country has been allotted political geniuses. One cannot say that political genius arises more frequently and easily in England. What the English had and have ahead of other peoples are not the great individuals, the Cromwells and Pitts: it is the political spirit that dominates the totality, a broad political upper class whose inherited tradition and coherent cast of mind guarantee a high average standard: where genius is absent, talent receives reliable guidance; incompetence is not tolerated; and a large number of dependable, efficient executive organs are always available, without which even genius would founder on the stubborn intractability of things. Every Englishman, Novalis said, is an island. This insular closedness of the British type is the basis of the political performance of Britom. Every Englishman carries his country around with him, representing it wherever he goes; consequently, every Englishman abroad is consciously or unconsciously an agent of his people's world domination.

It is the worldview of Puritanism that has produced and maintained this type. It is a result of the spiritual development of the seventeenth century. Puritanism made out of the stubborn everyday work of this world a duty and out of such fulfillment of duty a religion. The Englishman of the seventeenth century who sat at his office desk served his God loyally and modestly in this way. The colonist who worked the virgin soil of distant lands did his religious duty and worked for the world domination of England. Both were one and the same to him. On the soil of this tradition of the seventeenth century arose that political naivety of the Englishman that is not conscious to the Englishman himself and is rarely understood in its roots by other peoples. For the Englishman, Britishness and civilization, the idea of humanity, world peace, and the idea of English world domination are one and the same. England's preeminence seems to him synonymous with the interest of humanity. England is freedom. The naive Englishman does not understand how there can be peoples who do not want to grasp the blessings of English world domination. Since England's

cause is the cause of civilization, indeed of humanity, every threat to this rule appears to him as a sin against civilization. This mood is thoroughly honest. It is frequently perceived by other peoples as falsehood and hypocrisy. Yet it is not that. It is naivety, but not hypocrisy. When English politics intervenes in the disputes of other peoples in the name of humanity and civilization and pockets new territorial gains for English world domination in the process, yet no Englishman would understand if outside England this safeguarding of humanity's interest is designated as hypocrisy. If on the basis of this mood England appears to every Englishman as the actual bearer of the humanity idea, the naive belief of the Briton in his right to world domination also rests upon the same mood. This right does not appear to the Briton to rest upon power relations or the preponderance of English interests; it is a kind of God-given right that not even the enemy has a moral right to tamper with. Hence the peculiar moral note that characterizes the political appearance of Britannia even where this appearance appears to anyone who does not recognize England's divine right to world domination as standing in contradiction to all laws of morality. When the English bombarded Copenhagen in time of peace in 1807 and took away the Danish fleet, this deed aroused a storm of moral indignation everywhere outside England; but the proclamation that England addressed to the Danish people prior to this taking away grounds this measure in a thoroughly naive manner with the interest of freedom and the peace of peoples. Like this one, countless documents of the same kind could be enumerated from the history of English conquests.

This mode of thought characterizes English nationalism. It distinguishes it from the nationalism of all other peoples of the present. Whoever looks for parallels must go back in history as far as the Roman Empire. Precisely this parallel, however, is significant. English nationalism like that of the ancient Romans is the self-feeling of those who possess. With other peoples, nationalism is only the striving for a world domination that they do not yet possess and perhaps can never possess. Hence English nationalism presents itself as cosmopolitanism. It is that, however, only seemingly. It seemingly lacks that drive of dissatisfaction, that turbulent desire, the passionateness

that characterizes the nationalist movements of other countries. And yet such a judgment would be an error. That becomes apparent whenever English world domination is impaired from any side or endangered in its foundations. Indeed, the expressions of English nationalism tend to be of such a kind in such times that they appear morbid and hysterical to the continental European. That was the case, for example, around the middle of the previous century as a result of French fleet plans. Closer to our memory are the emotional movements that German naval armaments and Germany's efforts in the field of aviation have provoked in England. The Reichsgerman newspapers have poured bitter mockery over individual expressions of these emotional movements, especially over invasion panic and airship hysteria. As much as such expressions invited mockery and as ridiculous as they seemed to the educated Englishman, they nonetheless testify, if one abstracts from their form, to a thoroughly serious nationalist basic mood and a height of demands for world domination that sees, in the claim of foreign states not to be placed from the outset at the mercy of the English fleet, an attack on the foundations of English world domination.

It is known to what degree England has made the fleet question the pivot of its internal as well as external politics, how upon German naval construction it has increased its expenditures for the fleet many times over, wherein not the government, but the mood of the people had the lead and mostly only disputed whether the government's demands were sufficient, but rarely whether they went too far. In all declarations of official and unofficial circles of the British Empire in favor of disarmament or understanding concerning the restriction of maritime armaments, it has always only been a question of a guarantee of British naval supremacy, never of its restriction. For the naive Englishman, the blame for the armaments burden falls on those states that want to rebel against the unrestricted sea rule of England, which appears to the Englishman as right. The German government has repeatedly and emphatically stressed in its naval armaments that these armaments are intended to be purely defensive, for the protection of growing German overseas trade, and that their point is directed against no other power, will not infringe upon a foreign maritime

hegemony and will not found a German one, indeed are entirely independent of the maritime armaments of other powers. These declarations have made as good as no impression on the public opinion of England; the English government has, in contrast to this German stance, always openly justified its fleet reinforcements with German armaments, and the public opinion of England has scarcely understood that German armaments can have any other purpose than an attack on English sea rule, since the protection of trade and the freedom of the seas are best guaranteed precisely by this British sea rule.

English nationalism remains nationalism even when it assumes a cosmopolitan guise and speaks without hypocrisy of world peace, freedom, and civilization. Indeed, this cosmopolitan demeanor only shows on how high a stage it stands. What distinguishes it from the nationalism of other countries is its success, the abundance of what it has achieved.

In the year 1912, the English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, declared in a speech on colonial questions: England is saturated. Has English nationalism arrived at the goal of its desires? Does the control of the fifth part of the inhabited world suffice for it?

It would contradict the essence of the nationalist tendency, which is insatiable, if this were so. First of all, it must be said: England is saturated because it is digesting. It may be saturated for a long time to come because it has to digest for a long time to come. The question that currently stands at the center of its interest is the question of the political organization of the immense empire, the Greater British problem. The world empire is engaged in an internal transformation. The problem of this transformation absorbs the imperialist interest and would suffice by itself to explain that state of saturation claimed by the English minister.

But otherwise, too, this claimed saturation can only be understood relatively. It is correct that for a decade the British Empire has imposed a certain restraint upon itself in all undertakings that have no direct or indirect connection with the current possession status, its expansion, and its securing; that England neither sought to utilize the Balkan crisis and

Turkish embarrassments for imperialist expansion, nor undertook to touch the existence of the Congo State and Portuguese colonies in central Africa in any way, that it has met Russian expansion in Persia and Mongolia only with diplomatic means under careful safeguarding of good relations with Russia, but without energy, and especially in Persia has on the whole initiated a slow retreat. But all of that is grounded in the particular political constellation and the tactical conclusions that English diplomacy believed it had to draw from it, but not in an actual internal saturation of the world empire or even in a slackening of the national life-drive of the British nation. For that matter, this saturation is not old. A little more than a decade ago, England annexed the Boer republics and acquired the immense territory of the Sudan, so that today already that plan of an English Cape-Cairo railway once decried as fantastic, which the great Cecil Rhodes conceived in the eighties, is for the most part executed, needing for its completion only one further confrontation with Germany and Belgium.

No one can reproach the British Empire with such ever-new plans. It turns out that every possession pushes beyond itself. It is to be expanded, and expansion requires extension. Here too, life means growth. Egypt requires the Sudan as a hinterland. England must rule the Sudan to secure Egypt. If the Russian drive to the south in Persia were to progress further, it will secure southern Persia for the security of India, even if against its will. Thus England is driven by possession itself to ever new acquisitions. It is a fundamental property of every possession in money as in land that its preservation requires its multiplication.

This saturation of British nationalism is thus only a seeming one; it is the result of a constellation that is perhaps sooner or later transient and a political instinct of the nation that takes account of the tactical conclusions resulting from the constellation. Only in connection with this political instinct can the peculiarity of English nationalism be understood. To this nationalism it everywhere comes down to the essence of the matter and nowhere to the semblance. Therein an old tradition of power is revealed. Young nationalism tends to intoxicate itself on the external semblance of power and to worship prestige; in the process, it can happen that real

powerlessness hides beneath this semblance. English nationalism has had time to cure itself of the joy in semblance without having unlearned how to handle the real power of semblance masterfully. A further reason for the apparent saturation of English nationalism is that English power extends far beyond the territory over which the English flag flies, and far beyond the military reach of the island kingdom. English nationalism therefore sees no need to annex territories to the British Empire when the Empire can in fact control them through naval superiority, diplomacy, or capital, even if they appear nominally free and independent. Thus Portugal, and to a diminished degree Spain also, is in truth a dependency of the British Empire. Japan cannot tear itself loose from the fetters of the English money market; England does not need to gain a foothold in South America, because its most significant and future-rich state, Argentina, is financed by the London Stock Exchange and thus ruled. England has taken care that the states surrounding India, whose incorporation would create an English-Russian border, remain seemingly independent, but in truth function as outposts of the Indian fortress. The naive joy of young nationalism, which measures the power of the fatherland by the size of the territories that have the color of the fatherland in the atlas, is foreign to English nationalism.

England's world domination rests on the fleet; and yet it would be untenable if it rested only on the fleet. In reality it reaches much further than the fleet. Besides sea rule, it has two other pillars: the British cultural context and the London Stock Exchange.

The power of the British cultural context is a hard-to-grasp imponderable. It rests on the internal strength of uniformity, the suggestive power of the British ideal of humanity. It is hardly possible to overestimate this imponderable, but very difficult to ground its significance. The psychological laws governing these connections are little researched and hard to research. The British type is contagious. It has much that is seductive for individuals of other origin, imprints itself easily, and can be easily assumed. Every type is the draft of an ideal of humanity. The property of transferability rests upon the peculiarity of this ideal of humanity. This ideal of humanity is perhaps not a highest one; one can also

brand it as an average ideal; it has simple but firm traits, and precisely upon that rests its suggestiveness and its transferability. It is an extraordinarily healthy, harmoniously internal, and viable ideal. Duty, health, reasonable enjoyment of life, practical efficiency—an ideal of the mass that perhaps renounces all storming of heaven and all longing for the unattainable and with it also everything truly great and the deep pathos of man. This type is not the highest ideal of humanity that can be drafted, but certainly the most politically useful. It founds a uniformity of humans and their interests that guarantees internal cohesion and in political relation represents a centripetal moment of the greatest significance. This uniformity and this natural cohesion guarantee the harmlessness of freedom and enable, with the moral qualities of the type, that constitutional ideal of self-government that makes England appear to other peoples as the land of the political ideal condition, the land of freedom and civilization simply. The enormous importance of these connections is shown by English colonial policy. Only because England could give complete freedom to the colonies without danger has it been able to preserve the white colonies for the world empire; and this complete freedom it could only give because it could count on the strength of this cultural context, on the uniformity of the type, and on the reasonable valuation of common practical interests.

The strength, closedness, and uniformity of the British type do not allow the colonial Englishman to develop into a separate national individuality. England can be confident that, in a merger with English settlers, South Africa's Boers will be more likely to adopt the British type than to assimilate the English, and the same applies to the French minority of Canada. It can use immigrants of all states for the opening of its wide colonies; the Russian Jew becomes an Englishman just as well as the German and Slovene. It therefore does not need to shy away from the nationalization of people of foreign origin out of fear for the purity of its type like other countries; it does not do so and can thus let itself be revered as the sanctuary of freedom and home of all the homeless. The modern English financial aristocracy, and precisely that part of it upon which the most modern methods of imperialism rest, is of Jewish origin, but

completely fused with the leading circles of the British Empire. This is seemingly only a question of institutions and customs, but in truth a question of the strength of the national type that makes such institutions and customs possible.

There will perhaps come a time when German South-West Africa, settled by German immigrants, will not only demand self-government, but also have to receive it. If Germanism has not attained the draft of a firm and closed human type by then, there will very soon form from the self-made-independent immigrants a new, independent national individuality; and the exercise of their centrifugal drives will be a question of chance, of violence, or of external interests.

In Germany, where like in all young states the power of violence is overestimated because one has already often enough made the experience of Napoleon I regarding the impuissance de la force, but has not yet understood it deeply enough, it is commonly believed that the British Empire must collapse with the destruction of the English fleet. Even though it is impossible to prophesy and in such things everything depends on the closer circumstances, one can nevertheless say that whoever judges thus has not understood the foundations of English power. It would perhaps lose its tropical colonies, Egypt, India, and a large part of its influence on the non-English countries, but its rule over Australia, South Africa, and Canada would scarcely be touched—unless in the case of Canada the United States succeeds in converting the Canadians to a merger. The power of that cultural context does not sink with the cannons of British ships.

Against this, the collapse of that cultural context could destroy the British Empire irretrievably. The English type rests on the ideal of humanity of Puritanism. It is the ideal of sober industry, of this-worldly fulfillment of duty. This ideal has outlived the religious belief upon which it was founded. The unbelieving grandchildren have inherited it in the blood from the believing ancestors. But it is possible that without the protection of belief this ideal must fall prey to a gradual decomposition. Signs of such decomposition are present in the intellectual development of the England

of recent decades. Modernity knows no answer to the question: why fulfillment of duty? The actual, deepest, and from a broader perspective most dangerous problem of English world power is the question of whether the future will be able to preserve the old answer of the Puritan intact, revive it anew, or give a new answer, or give reason to the head-shaking of skepticism. Only then would the decay of the British Empire be sealed.

As a further pillar of English rule, economic interest steps next to this cultural context. Both pillars support each other, just as both in turn are supported by the third, sea rule. There is no doubt that belonging to the British Empire is a brilliant business for the colonies. They have the London Stock Exchange behind all their undertakings. Probably the English colonies as independent states would have to pay 6 to 8 percent interest for their loans instead of 3 to 4. From London flows the fertilizing stream of money. Belonging to the British Empire is in economic relation a kind of connection to an extensive and reliably working irrigation system. These material interest connections by themselves would perhaps not suffice to preserve the empire from internal disturbances. The time in which one believed in the omnipotence of material interests is over. The time has realized that the material interest that can be calculated in numbers does not suffice for the founding of states and empires and must bow before the power of the idea and of feeling, before national imponderables and the drive to freedom. But since England knows how to handle colonial imponderables with caution and supple cleverness, gladly and completely gives harmless freedom, and since by virtue of that strong cultural context the colonies remain ideally tied to the motherland, nothing opposes the unifying power of material interests, whence they can do their full work.

We can only touch upon these connections here, not depict them in detail. The central problem of the internal politics of modern England is imperialism. The question, the answer to which divides opinions, can be formulated as follows: by what means should the immense world empire be held together and consolidated as an internal unit? Should England transition to protective tariffs in order to be able to favor the colonies economically? Is it possible to form a uniform economic area from the

scattered countries? If it is possible, is it politically necessary, or do the cultural connection and the financial bond suffice?

As is known, the Conservative Party's transition to protective tariffs brought the Liberals the power they still hold today. Liberal imperialism has placed the main weight on the cultural connection, and the development of the colonies and their relationship to the mother country have provided no argument against the correctness of this policy. One can even say it has been proven that from a political standpoint, English protective tariffs with preferential tariffs for the colonies are not necessary as an imperialist measure. Another question is, of course, whether the economic interests of English industry will not sooner or later require protective tariffs.

English politics is thoroughly conscious of the significance of this cultural connection. It has centralized the shaping of opinion in the colonies in London in a very clever way. It is thoroughly imperialistic in coloring. The Australian, South African, and Canadian presses judge on the basis of news material that reaches them from London and only from London. These news items repeatedly vary the theme that the prosperity and freedom of the colonies can be protected only by a strong England, and speak of German plans regarding Australia and the like. The significance attributed to this shaping of opinion is shown behind the lines by the negotiations of the Imperial Conferences on press matters. In the history of the colonies' contributions to the costs of the English fleet, this shaping of opinion has played an essential role.

The expenditures that little England must make for the maintenance of its colonies have grown rapidly and sharply in the last decade. Moreover, England has felt compelled to keep the greater part of its fleet power available in home waters. As a result, the brilliance of English sea power overseas has diminished. Supremacy in the Mediterranean could not be maintained. In the Pacific, the Australians find themselves without sufficient protection against Japan, which they view with suspicion. This development has placed English politics before the necessity of shifting the burdens of imperial defense from the shoulders of smaller England to the broader shoulders of Greater Britain.

This has, as is known, partly succeeded and is partly well on the way. The colonies are making increasing contributions to the cost of the fleet. But they make a demand whose justification they derive from this performance: participation in the political leadership of the empire. They have been met halfway through the institution of the so-called Imperial Conferences and the inclusion of leading colonial ministers in imperial deliberations; granting this demand, which is pursued with particular emphasis by Canada, would presuppose a restructuring of the British constitution and the entire imperial organization, which is very difficult to push through on the basis of England's parliamentary institutions. According to human foresight, decades will pass before this difficult constitutional-technical problem is solved. The desire of the colonies, however, will grow ever stronger, and one day a solution will be found. The political cleverness and suppleness of Britishness guarantees this. Dionysius of Halicarnassus once found the reason for Rome's successes and the failure of the Athenian Empire in the elasticity of Roman politics, which understood how to adapt the form of the state to changed conditions, whereas Athens was unable to stretch the brittle shell of its civic constitution and internally incorporate everything annexed. Everything speaks for the fact that the history of the future will also compare England to the Roman Empire in this respect.

7.

Among the great powers of world politics, the German Empire is the youngest. Internal disruption and a lack of political talent deprived the German people of any political standing for long centuries. Brilliant military successes remained without political utility. The military efficiency of the population benefited foreign interests. England fought its colonial wars with German mercenaries. When a unified German Empire was subsequently created through the tenacious energy of the Prussian stock and the genius of Bismarck, thereby giving the German people the external opportunity for world-political activity, it had become late; the best pieces of the globe were distributed. After the fortunate war against France, Bismarck saw the main task in the consolidation of the achieved unity. To distract France's gaze from the Rhine border, he favored French expansion in Africa and

Asia as much as he could. When, toward the end of his activity, he set out to secure some remaining pieces of Africa for Germany's future colonial activity, he carefully avoided going further than English interests could bear. He avoided expanding from German South-West Africa into the hinterland of the Cape Colony, present-day Rhodesia. Bismarck kept German world politics within the limits that consideration for continental policy had, in his view, to impose upon it, placed continental policy above world policy in every respect, and allowed the latter only what the former permitted.

The young German Empire, however, pressed out into the world. The population grows by 800,000 to 900,000 people annually and nourishment or, which is the same thing, work must be found for these new masses. In order for the country to be able to nourish its growing population, German goods must find an increasing market abroad. More and more goods must find their way across the borders. The magnificent economic upswing that followed political consolidation is well known. Thanks to the tenacious diligence, efficiency, scientific education, and life-drive of the German people, it succeeded in exporting goods in place of people. The German economy spanned the world with its interests and achievements; it has conquered a first place in some branches and a second or third in all. Political interest had to follow economic interest. The enormous labor output of the upward-striving people forces the young empire into world politics.

The history of national sentiment runs parallel to this economic development. The unification of Germany was, on the one hand, a conclusion of national development, a fulfillment of national wishes. On the other hand, it was the beginning of a new development, the seed of new, far-reaching desires. Just as for the striving of the individual, there is no conclusion and no end for the desires of peoples. With the emergence of world-political interests, German nationalism has also oriented itself world-politically. The German people's claims to power and standing, not only in Europe but around the globe, have risen rapidly. When Prince Bülow's government dissolved the Reichstag in 1907 over a colonial-policy

question and appealed to the people, election technicians clinging to the experiences of earlier times considered the election slogan unpopular and defeat inevitable. The opposite occurred. The older generation of politicians stood astonished before the elemental power of the nation's world-political will to standing.

If one compares the attitude of opposition parties and newspapers toward national questions, especially armaments on land or water, twenty and ten years ago with today, it is obvious to everyone that almost everything has changed here. No bourgeois party can afford a policy of negation in such questions; even Social Democracy, in its parliamentary behavior and its agitation among the people, must take more and more account of the national argument from year to year. Fleet policy in particular is borne by an emotional popularity before the suggestive power of which even those politicians who, out of tactical considerations, doubted the political utility of large-scale naval construction had to bow in time.

This development of economic interests and world-political sentiments on the one hand, and the consequences of the German Empire's continental situation on the other, establish the peculiarity of modern Germany's political situation. Germany is surrounded and enclosed by countries of a developed and ancient state culture. It borders on no area of possible colonial expansion. It lies in the middle of the great powers. No other state is in the same position. All its neighbors have a possible expansion area at their doorstep. Russia has Asia, Austria-Hungary the Balkans, France and Italy the North African coast, and sea-encircled England the world. All these states more or less have only one side to defend and the other free. Situated in the center of Europe, Germany is more dependent on the political constellation of Europe than its neighbors. It is harder to secure against hostile alliances and requires a greater expenditure of diplomatic or military means of power for such security. Bismarck's policy rested on the recognition of this situation; as essentially continental policy, it subordinated the desirabilities of world policy to the necessities of this continental policy.

It is obvious that in all African, Turkish, Persian, and Chinese undertakings, German policy must first ask itself what repercussions such intervention by Germany must exert on the constellation of the European continent. When encountering Russian interests in European Turkey, Persia, or China, it will bind Russia even closer to the side of the immutably hostile France; when infringing upon an English sphere of interest in Mesopotamia, it will see England step to the side of its opponents. Indeed, Germany's first world-political undertakings have had such effects. German Orient policy, initiated by the Baghdad Railway enterprise, showed Russians and Englishmen a possible common enemy and contributed much to their understanding, which is why many German diplomats of a continental mindset declared this enterprise entirely misguided for reasons of political tactics and held this and other undertakings of a world-political character responsible for the difficulties that German policy encountered everywhere in the first decade of the twentieth century as a result of a constellation of the great world powers oriented against it.

When Germany deviated from Bismarck's tradition in 1904 in the face of France's colonial expansion and undertook to oppose it—which Bismarck had previously supported—this turnaround, despite the multiple subsidiary moments and subsidiary intentions whose influence and correctness historical judgment can scarcely yet pass upon, was the expression and recognition of a necessity given by economic development not to let future-rich countries fall completely under foreign influence. But precisely this recognition clarified the peculiar dilemma between continental-political considerations and world-political interests that characterizes the political situation of the German Empire. It is claimed that a few years earlier the German Empire still had the opportunity, jointly with England, to halt the French advance in Morocco. Be that as it may, in its action Germany found England and Russia on the side of France—Russia as the money-needing ally of the French, and England because, for a number of reasons including Germany's world-political intentions, its Orient policy, and naval construction, it had approached France and promised its support in the Moroccan question.

When Germany then, building on the legal foundation of its thesis, instead of forcing frightened France into a separate agreement under the pressure of its military superiority, resorted to the diplomatic means of a conference, it found itself faced by a closed phalanx against which, unless it wished to unleash a European war from an unfavorable position and against the sympathies of the world, it had to agree to a treaty that, while not by wording, did so practically make France's Moroccan expansion possible.

The limits that this treaty imposed on that expansion were slowly shifted and extended by France's labor and the development that conditions in Morocco itself took under the influence of this labor. From the Algeciras Conference in 1906 to the February Agreement of 1909, German policy was in the following situation: France slowly expanded the Algeciras Act and gradually undermined the independence and autonomy of the Sultan, which this Act in principle sought to preserve. Germany had enough handles to intervene against this procedure on the basis of the international act. Yet whenever it wanted to do so, it found itself confronted by a grouping of powers under whose protection French policy believed itself secure and ready to make no concessions. Indeed, every German action had to weld that grouping closer together. Edward VII's so-called encirclement policy formed and proved itself on the Moroccan question. The triviality of France's individual violations of the Algeciras Act made it practically impossible for German policy to make use of the argument of the sword.

Thus German policy in the Moroccan question was paralyzed by a European constellation that had formed around this issue, and had to feel the consequences of this constellation in other questions besides the Moroccan one. In this connection between world policy and continental policy lies, if one will, the circulus vitiosus of the German Empire's foreign policy. World-political undertakings have repercussions on continental policy, under the influence of which the German Empire must restrict itself world-politically.

World policy, however, must be pursued. Economic expansion and the people's will to live push outward. German policy must escape the circulus vitiosus. It cannot opt for pure continental policy. The task posed by this

situation is the actual problem of the German Empire's foreign policy. Everything that happens can be conceived as an attempt at its solution. It is clear that the German Empire's world-political freedom of movement is greater the more independent its continental position is from the constellation of the powers. Therefore, the first order of business is to free the German Empire from the "cauchemar des coalitions" that oppressed Bismarck. Therefore, the primary requirement of German world policy is that Germany be so strong on the continent that the chances of victory are on its side against any possible constellation. Only then will it be able to shoulder the repercussions on the continental constellation during world-political undertakings. Indeed, these repercussions will fail to materialize once it is clear that even a coalition of Germany's world-political opponents cannot attack it on the continent with any prospect of success. The decision regarding German world policy is made on the continent.

German public opinion has not yet entirely grasped this connection between Germany's military position on the continent and its world-political freedom of movement. To it, the fleet appears to be the primary instrument of world policy. And precisely because the nation's political longing is directed world-politically, the fleet is more popular in contemporary Germany than the army. Yet one can perhaps imagine a German world policy without a preeminent position at sea, but certainly none without such a position on land. Important as the fleet is for the real protection of overseas interests as well as for the imponderables of power, the army is even more important. The influence of the strong position on land is admittedly an indirect one that strikes the eye less than the direct and tangible effect of the position at sea.

Through its recent army augmentation, Germany has taken a major step toward that consolidation of its continental position which forms the basis of world-political freedom of movement. The countermeasures of the French show the world that Germany is the naturally stronger party and can no longer be paralyzed militarily by the efforts of possible opponents. With this, if reason and insight into the real situation govern human actions, the

position of these possible opponents toward Germany's world-political undertakings must gradually change.

For the gradual liberation of German policy from the aforementioned circulus vitiosus, as well as for the peculiarity of its possibilities and conditions, the second phase of the Morocco crisis is particularly characteristic. This second phase, which can be designated as its liquidation, begins with the Franco-German Morocco Agreement of February 1909. Through this agreement, German policy promised, on the basis of the Algeciras Act, not to hinder France's political action in Morocco, in exchange for which France promised Germany's economic equality of rights and consideration for its economic interests. Through this treaty, German policy attempted to sever the Moroccan question from European politics and rid itself of its repercussion on the continental constellation. The Moroccan question had, as it were, thrown a net over German freedom of movement. One sought to free oneself from this net. There is no doubt whatsoever that this agreement signified the retreat, or the continuation of the retreat, that Germany had begun at the Algeciras Conference. If it later turned out that this retreat was not complete, but contained within itself a possible resumption position by invoking the Algeciras Act, it still cannot be claimed that this retreat was even then merely a sham maneuver and that German policy could count on a future resumption.

The agreement proved to be a correct calculation. Europe felt relieved. The Moroccan pressure had lifted from German policy. A transaction with Russia became possible through which, in exchange for recognizing Russia's preferential position in northern Persia, Russia abandoned its resistance to the Baghdad Railway and a Germano-Russian point of contention was removed from the world. The diplomatic encirclement that had proven itself and maintained itself during the Morocco crisis was broken.

Now German policy could venture to resume the Moroccan question and at least push through a favorable liquidation. Unless such a resumption were to trigger the same repercussion on Europe all over again, this attempt had

to lead to a short and complete liquidation. The undertaking would not have succeeded had French policy not made a decisive error in handling the Moroccan troubles. It did not understand how to wait. Had it understood how to wait, Morocco would have fallen into its lap slowly but surely, without Germany finding an opportunity to raise compensation claims. It undertook an expedition to Fez, which was indeed reachable but could not be left again. The military occupation of the capital, however, violated the basic provisions of the Algeciras Act, which formed the basis of the February Agreement, and thus returned freedom of action to German policy. The dispatch of two warships to Agadir to protect Germans threatened there was legally unassailable.

France was faced with the choice of removing Germany from southern Morocco by means of force or peaceful understanding. In the former case, the odium of war would have fallen upon the republic. France chose the second path. It is known how much the lengthy negotiations shook Europe. Ultimately, France received the protectorate over Morocco in exchange for safeguarding Germany's economic interests in Morocco and a quantitatively significant, qualitatively partly disputed territorial cession on the Congo. If one considers the prior devaluation of the Moroccan share, it must be said that Germany achieved a disproportionately favorable liquidation at the eleventh hour.

But with what expenditure of effort and diplomatic means, under what risk had this been made possible! This chapter of German world policy illustrates like no other the peculiarity of the empire's world-political situation, the limitation of its expansion possibilities, the linkage of world policy with continental policy, and the complexity of factors that a German world policy has to reckon with. All these difficulties spring from a geographical situation that fetters great forces and inhibits freedom of movement; hence Germany, in order to be able to pursue world policy, requires an enormous unfolding of real means of power.

Furthermore, this Moroccan episode makes it possible to demonstrate the development that the German people's political will to standing has taken since the founding of the empire—specifically, not only its increase in

intensity, but also its lack of judgment and sureness of aim. This state of mind of the nation regarding world policy, and its relationship to the aforementioned conditions and difficulties of world-political activity, characterizes the peculiarity of German world policy.

It is easy, and therefore hardly necessary, to demonstrate that the political life-drive of the German people has grown strongly and uninterruptedly since the founding of the empire. Its growth has kept pace with the growth of interests; indeed, if feelings could be measured numerically, one would probably have to say it has outpaced them. German nationalism foams over today when areas in which Germany still has scarcely any noteworthy interests are closed off to future German influence, showing that even to the most cosmopolitan of all peoples, that boundlessness of striving which constitutes the essence of nationalism is not alien.

We can register this growth of national sentiment everywhere we compare expressions of political thought from the first two decades after the founding of the empire with those of the present. Most apparent is surely the testimony borne by the turnaround in the attitude that political parties and newspapers adopt toward national demands. The struggles provoked by the military bills of the eighties are unthinkable today. None of the bourgeois parties can dare any longer to reject an augmentation of military power means that the government declares necessary in the interest of the empire's foreign position; even Social Democracy, which, bound by its program, naturally remains an opponent, must exercise a certain caution and restraint in combating such demands and does not deny that it is certain of a sensitive defeat if it comes to new elections over such a question. This means nothing other than that the national drive today no longer commands merely the feelings of the educated, the nobility, or the urban bourgeoisie, but is alive within the people itself, growing incessantly, and even where it seems to be absent, only slumbers awaiting the call of events.

At no time, on no occasion, has the German government experienced such violent and passionate attacks as during the Moroccan affair and especially during the phase of this affair that can be designated as its final liquidation. The dispatch of two warships to Agadir acted like a wake-up call upon

German nationalism. These circles felt called out of a forced passivity—in which Germany was supposed to watch enviously the world-political progress of other nations while itself having no progress to show that could be pointed out on the map—to the final use of their forces, whose superiority they were conscious of. People believed the government had finally realized that Germany could not let the rich land where milk and honey were seen flowing fall into the hands of insolent France, and was setting out to snatch it away at the last moment. When it was then learned that the government was pushing through nothing more than a tolerable settlement of the tiresome affair and, as we must assume, wanted to push through, people were disappointed, depressed, and felt betrayed. The conduct of foreign policy was attacked with a passion that was unthinkable only a few years earlier on such an occasion, and whose excessiveness exceeded all bounds of sound reason.

This excessiveness characterizes the state of mind in which the nationalist movement of modern Germany finds itself. There is something touching and at the same time elementally powerful in how this young people, having attained political unity after centuries of disruption, foreign rule, and political suffering, is now seized by the longing for power and has become conscious of itself, shaking off its cosmopolitan sleep and the memories of Cinderella as it presses across the seas. But precisely this predominance of the emotional character in German nationalism shows how much this unpolitical nation still lacks those qualities that the great world-political peoples of all times have possessed and had to possess. Passion alone has never sufficed at any time. German nationalism still has a bit of the manners of a young dog about it which, awkward and clumsy, does not yet know how to use its still unwieldy limbs or when it ought to bark. Political passion lacks political sense. This is not astonishing; where should it come from? It presupposes tradition and a long history. It is acquired in generations, and today's generation is the first in the history of the German people to be confronted with world-political tasks. German nationalism is not yet free from the manners of the upstart; here and there it still has admixtures of envy and resentment, both of which are poor counselors. It

looks more to externality than to true essence, has a belief in force that is well suited to acquire but never to preserve what it has acquired, does not know that things must ripen and that patience is one of the primary political virtues, but rather possesses the understandable impatience of a people that, trodden underfoot for centuries, has had to wait and began to grow when others already possessed the lion's share of what is worth owning. German nationalism saw Morocco sink in the sea through the November Agreement of 1911 and reproached the government for having declined to wage a war against France and England for the possession of this country. Passion and impatience argue thus; calculating reason must tell itself that French rule cannot make Morocco vanish from the face of the earth either, that if a victorious war is the prerequisite for its acquisition, this war can be fought later and under all human foresight under more favorable conditions—hence with more prospect of success—and then win, alongside other things, a pacified and thus better Morocco as the prize of victory. Against such reasoning, from the standpoint of even the most passionate nationalism, nothing can be objected. And yet none of the newspapers in the German Reich that reacted so despairingly argued this way. Nor are German nationalists clear about the exceedingly complex context in which world policy and continental policy stand for German policy, nor about the limits and considerations that this context imposes upon it. They are clear only about their will to power and world-political standing.

If we recall the distinction made in the first chapter between an extensive and an intensive nationalism, it cannot be denied that the nationalist movement in Germany, as indeed in all European countries, is primarily extensive. That is not very astonishing, for the professed nationalists are everywhere precisely the party and group that represent the extensive component of the national life-drive. Intensive nationalism is by its nature everywhere directed more culturally than politically and therefore does not play the same role in the political life of nations. What is peculiar, however, and in a certain sense characterizes the epoch and thus requires highlighting, is that the extensive component in our time everywhere

appears to be stronger than the intensive. This applies not only to Germany, but to all other countries, though it may be demonstrated here using the example of Germany.

People speak and write much more about an extension of German power than about a deepening and inner enrichment of the German essence. Economic expansion is measured in numbers, and people forget to ask whether this growth in breadth also corresponds to a growth in depth, whether the German essence has deepened or perhaps flattened. It might perhaps be easy to demonstrate by comparison with the cultural blossom of the German spirit and German sentiment in earlier times that the latter is the case and that the time of an enormous upswing in the economic sphere is a time of cultural flattening. Such proof applies not only to Germany but to all countries and characterizes the epoch to a certain degree. The great spiritual conceptions upon which the peculiarity of peoples and their cultures was formed belong to earlier times; our time has none to show through which the inner essence of peoples has been reshaped, further developed, or deepened.

The problem as such does not belong within the framework of this presentation. But the indirect consequences of this development spill over into the world-political sphere. It is possible that this phenomenon is a temporary consequence of a time of enormous external movement that absorbs all forces, and that sooner or later the nations will resume growth in depth, if one may so express it. Then perhaps this reversal will initially act to dampen the extensiveness of nationalism as a primary interest, but in the final analysis will supply it with even greater force for later through an accentuation of national personalities. It is further possible that this is not a temporary but a permanent phenomenon that has only just begun to develop. In this case, the problem acquires world-historical significance. It is clear that if we compare the organic people, its growth and destiny, with the life of a tree, culture—its strength and peculiarity—plays the role that the roots do in the life of this tree. Roots and branches must grow organically; if the roots lag behind, the overdeveloped branches will not halt the destruction of the tree, but rather accelerate it. This is merely a

simile and, like all similes, skewed and inaccurate. But there is no doubt that everywhere and always in history, the decline of peoples has begun with the decline of their cultures. That which holds peoples together in their innermost core, gives them infinite striving, and enables the compatriot to work beyond his own personal interests in the service of a supra-individual duty—indeed, to see his life in the fulfillment of such duties—is not blood relationship alone; it is the conscious or unconscious idea in which the essence of the people has invested itself, the belief in something higher that lives precisely in its people and is supposed to fulfill itself. Without this belief, every nationalism is condemned.

A decline of cultural deepening means nothing other than the decay of this belief. In this sense, the destiny of the British Empire hangs on the question of whether that religious-political idea created by the duty-belief of the Puritans—which governed old England and made it great—will be able to maintain itself in the new or be replaced by a new conception of the ideal. In the same sense, Germany's destiny hangs on the question of whether the old idealism will be able to maintain itself in the new configuration of external things and find a new form. But if it is correct that the culture of peoples is flattening everywhere, losing depth and inner content, then that means that the spring is also beginning to dry up from which the nation as a supra-individual organism drinks eternal life-force, and then in the beginning of such a development we hold the beginning of a twilight of nationalism itself. Then this means nothing other than that nations cease to be the bearers of ideas, and then, since mankind's striving is eternal and infinite, they would be destined to be superseded perhaps by organisms of another kind in which the ideas then invest themselves; and if these organisms were arranged transversely, the age of nationalism would be followed by an age of a new cosmopolitanism. But even if the old peoples truly decline, such a development will always be temporary and will never encompass the entire earth, for other young peoples are still awaiting maturity, indeed birth; the womb of the earth will not become barren. National organisms have always proven themselves the stronger life

principle compared to any cosmopolitan movement, and as it has always been, so it will be in the future.

After this speculative digression, we return to Germany to characterize in summary the peculiarity of the factor that the German Empire signifies for the machinery of world politics. A young people of enormous work capacity and efficiency with a rapidly growing population has awakened to activity. It makes enormous progress in the economic sphere; its interests expand and reach across the seas. External necessity and internal life-drive force it into world politics. Hemmed in within unfavorable borders, it requires the deployment of great power for its defense, and is multiply inhibited in its world-political freedom of movement. For the sake of its world-political freedom, it must be secured at home against all eventualities. It cannot allow the still open world-political fields of activity to be blocked against it. An attempt at such blocking, perhaps accompanied by temporary success, will in the long run founder on both its real power and its massive life-drive.

8.

Under entirely different conditions and living circumstances has the development of the greatest extra-European world power, the United States of America, taken place. Whoever wishes to understand the peculiarity of its nationalism and world policy must dispense with European spectacles.

First of all, we are dealing here with a nation whose formation is not yet completed. Compared to it, European peoples are fixed types formed by a long past. Their peculiarity also continues to form and may change, but their inner possibilities are prefigured and limited, their outlines firmer. The crystallization core of the American nation was formed by the English immigrants of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Around their ideal world, their customs, their religious faith, their tenacity, and their organizational talent, the remaining and later immigration has gathered. The type formed by this mixture has admittedly become substantially

different, yet it has a great affinity with Britishness, and this affinity is maintained by the language that Britishness gave to the new nation.

What is nonetheless of the utmost importance for understanding today's American nation and its internal problems is the realization that the formation of an American type—of a specifically new ideal of humanity—is not yet completed even today. The enormous multiplication of immigration in the nineteenth century, a strong admixture of German and Irish blood, and then the enormous economic development that allowed ever-new possibilities to change rapidly have complicated the consolidation and calm inner development of an American human type. The beginnings are everywhere present; in the phraseology of political life, the concept of the American citizen, his customs and views, seems established; but upon closer inspection, it appears to exist only in outline. In a work from 1894 on "true Americanism," President Roosevelt showed how much of this is still fluctuating and unclear. His writing is a philippic against the European inclinations and preferences of old Americans, against the tendency of new immigrants to cling to their birthland with their memories. He preaches Americanism. But he shows himself, without wanting to, the root of all uncertainty. He must define the Americanism he preaches. What he says that is positive therein is, however, merely self-evident truths that apply to any national idea. What he says that is negative is merely the condemnation of those fluctuations and uncertainties.

No national ideal can be determined negatively. Ideals require a positive content in order to be effective. Naturally, the American ideal of humanity also has a thoroughly positive content. But precisely this content is still in the process of formation and is fluctuating. Much flows into it from the ideal content of the American Constitution, whose principles are a sort of bible to the American. The free citizen; a self-governing people open to all; freedom of belief; human rights; the pride that flows from this faith; and the duties of energetic self-proving that it imposes, the forward-looking gaze, the enormous possibilities that the wide land offers to the active joy of creation—all these are positive elements of Americanism. They have grown

out of the views of the old English immigrants who founded free America. They have taken possession of later immigrants of the Germanic race.

And yet much has since stood, and still stands today, in the way of this ideal's free unfolding and further development. First of all, the actual development of economic and, consequently, political conditions.

Since the beginning of the world, the ideal of freedom and all striving for it has been afflicted with a tragic destiny. In the end, it does not rid itself of the spirits it called. It gives birth to children who have a tendency to strangle the mother. Under its protection and elicited by it from the ever-creative human nature arise formations of a new power that, insatiable like every power, ultimately endanger the freedom of others. The liberation of economic life from all shackles of earlier centuries has brought economic life to enormous unfolding everywhere in the world. But everywhere new bonds have emerged from this unleashing. Freedom of competition and freedom of contract have been stabilized, and one must now observe how new powers emerge from freedom of contract which practically not only threaten freedom of competition—even if it still exists theoretically and in the laws of the state and the economic ideas of people—but have long since destroyed it in some areas of economic life and restricted it in others.

In no country has this development become so visible and advanced so far as in America. The problem of the trusts has become the pivot of domestic American politics. We cannot treat it within this framework, but must nonetheless mention it despite its great difficulty, since its consequences for the American ideal of humanity and thus for the world-political possibilities of Americanism are of the greatest importance. Out of the spirit of the American citizenry, the constitution, and the ideal foundations of American life, the state must wage a struggle against the new powers that have grown up in the trusts. It must wage it if it does not wish to surrender itself to these powers; in the state's struggle against the trusts, the old freedom idea of the American people fights the battle for itself. The holders of state power are forced by public opinion to wage the struggle against the trusts or at least to promise it. Aversion to the trusts plays a decisive role in elections. The struggle is hopeless; indeed, it can only be waged for show.

The power of the trusts over the state is greater than the power of trust-hostile voters; the trusts control reality, while hostility to the trusts controls only appearances. The trusts control the elections fought under the slogan of trust-hostility.

Here is revealed the tragedy of democratic freedom: freedom ultimately becomes a world of beautiful semblance into which the power of economic forces disguises itself. We stand today in the midst of this development, reading of lawsuits and programs against the trusts, of investigations and convictions, seeing indeed that the rule of the trusts changes its methods here and there, but seeing nowhere that it is shaken or broken in any way.

It is obvious that this development has placed a question mark behind the American freedom idea. This question mark is its influence on the American ideal of humanity, on the possibilities of the national type. The formation of this type is thereby interrupted, deflected from old paths into new ones. It is almost impossible today to overlook the significance of this development, which is taking place in the present and will only become visible in the future in a broader perspective. If we nevertheless hold fast, despite the materialistic tendencies of the age, to the lesson of history that wherever a world domination was founded and was meant to endure, belief in an ideal of humanity was the precondition that alone can organize force into power and without which everything crumbles, then we must also think of the question of the further world-political future of the United States as dependent upon the question of whether the beginnings of a positive ideal of humanity beyond the Atlantic will unfold or wither.

This tragedy of economic freedom corresponds to a tragedy of political freedom. Both are causally interconnected in the closest manner and form a process. It is the crisis of the representative system, which in turn is not restricted to the United States but is most advanced in them. This crisis touches another element of the old American ideal: the self-government of the sovereign people.

Here too, what was once truth seems to be on the way to becoming mere appearance. Parties arise from the currents within the people as

representatives of those currents and opinions. Yet even the faithful adherent of democratic dogma cannot deny that the parties thus formed, having become mighty organizations, have emancipated themselves and detached themselves from the soil upon which they arose. The party machine becomes an independent power. Even if it is not independent of the currents within the people, it is nonetheless no longer their faithful expression; it has grown so powerful and vast that if it finds itself in opposition to the popular currents, competition no longer arises naturally or can be conjured up lightly from the ground. Mastery over the currents within the people has thus become a complicated art that manages the appearances upon which public opinion everywhere hangs. In place of the independent voter, who threatens to sink into an empty abstraction, steps the professional electioneering operative; and even if the voter's mood still exerts an influence on party programs, it has no influence on their actions, and the belief that party programs correspond to their actions belongs to the past.

Springing from this crisis of the representative system are the successes of the referendum idea, which is advancing victoriously across individual states and municipalities, though its ultimate victory and potential effectiveness cannot yet be judged.

This internal development, we noted, has hindered the ideal unfolding and consolidation of the American type, turning it into a problem of the future. The later evolution of immigration has operated in the same direction.

Two factors combine here. The waves of immigrants who poured into the United States after the middle of the nineteenth century are, generally speaking, harder to uproot from their homeland than earlier ones. They originate from a time when national tendencies in old Europe had already grown strong; they have taken the national sentiment of their country of origin along with them, and the pulse of the homeland continues to beat within them. They encounter greater resistance to complete Americanization and thus complicate the unification of the American people. They become Americans while remaining Germans, Englishmen, or Irishmen, so that in place of a uniform Americanism, the type of the

German-American, Anglo-American, and Irish-American emerges. Instead of a single type, a multiplicity of types arises which, even though bound by a common Americanism, nonetheless diverge widely within the framework of that commonality.

Against this phenomenon, Roosevelt takes the field in the aforementioned writing against Americanism: "We welcome the German and the Irishman who want to become Americans, but we can have no use for a stranger who refuses to give up his nationality. We need no German-Americans and Irish-Americans who want to form a separate stratum in our political and social life. We can use nothing other than pure Americans, and if they are that entirely, then it can be a matter of indifference to us whether they are of German or Irish descent. There is no place in our healthy American commonwealth for a German-American or Irish-American tribe."

Yet, as anyone who examines the internal conditions of the United States can easily see, such appeals are of no avail: the role that ethnic organizations play in elections and otherwise in the public life of the state has increased in significance. Through this particularism existing within the American people, European differences spill over into the internal life of the United States, above all one difference: the German-English antagonism. In times of strained German-English relations and fierce press feuds between the German and English press, part of this press battle is fought out in the public opinion of the United States, where the feuds between German-American and Anglo-American newspapers do not lag behind the bitterness of German and English papers in Europe. Indeed, it would be easy to demonstrate from numerous examples of recent years that the dispute rages more fiercely in America than in Europe.

If one grasps this development from a broader perspective, one sees history wrestling with the solution of an interesting and rare problem: the creation of a new nation at a time when the old nations from which it is to be formed are being revitalized. It seems as though a future that cannot quite come into being is wrestling here with a past that is becoming ever more alive. If one were to push this line of thought unduly, one might say that

America is a hundred years too late; the formation of the new people ought to have been completed before the awakening of European nationalisms.

Ultimately, however, this problem and its difficulties pale in significance compared to another, heavier question posed to the idea of the American nation by a different factor in United States history.

This other factor is the fact that Germanic immigration has practically ceased, and in its place an enormous Romance and Slavic immigration has emerged. Germanic immigration was fundamentally homogeneous; even if it did not assimilate completely into the old Americanism, it did so for the most part and in essential points, without endangering the ideal foundations of previous Americanism. If complete amalgamation did not occur immediately, it was not hopeless. The new immigration, however, brings elements that are completely heterogeneous, both among themselves and in relation to previous Americanism. Nothing connects them with the American world of ideas. Figures speak a clear language regarding the significance of this shift. Development has only just begun to take this direction, yet already, alongside the trust question, it constitutes the most difficult problem in the internal politics of the United States.

According to the Census Bureau's publication on the results of the 1900 and 1910 censuses, the shift for New York is as follows: In 1900, the foreign-born population constituted one-third; by 1910, it reached 40% of the total population. It amounted to 1,927,000 in 1910 compared to 1,260,000 in 1900. Among these foreign-born individuals in 1900, those born in the German Empire held first place. By 1910, the Germans had been surpassed by Russians and Italians. 483,580 New Yorkers were born in Russia, among them at least two-thirds Jews. Then follows Italy with 340,524, Germany with 279,242, Ireland with 252,528, Austria (for the most part Slavs and Jews) 193,203, England with 101,217, and Hungary (likewise including many Slavs and Jews) with 73,336. Even though these New York figures do not apply to the entire country, they nevertheless indicate the direction in which development is heading. This development threatens not only the Germanic basis of the population's ethnic composition and the predominance of the Anglo-Saxon human type, but

equally the Protestant foundation of the American ideal world—thus endangering both racial unity and ideal unity. By religion, the new immigrants are for the most part Catholics, Russian Orthodox, and Jews. In Boston, the spiritual headquarters of Protestant life, 52% are now Catholic. Furthermore, these Romance and Slavic new immigrants have also brought their conscious nationalism with them to the New World, refuse to abandon their memories, form groups, and remain foreign bodies.

The American government, like the spiritual leaders of the nation, recognized the danger inherent in this development long ago. Its recent policy on the immigration question represents an attempt to correct this trend. Increasing demands are being placed on immigrants, and their admission has recently been made dependent not only on a minimum of financial resources, but also on proof of literacy, with illiterates no longer being admitted. Whether these regulations—which are directed solely against Slavic and Romance immigration, not against Germanic immigration—will help much remains to be seen.

Into this chaos of confusions comes the old, yet still unresolved problem of the Negro question. However, since the percentage ratio of Negroes to whites is declining, this problem burdens the future to no greater degree than the past and future, and can be left out of consideration for the purposes of this discussion.

Will American life be able to preserve the inner unity and commonality of its ideal foundations, insofar as it already possessed them, and win them, insofar as they were still lacking, when confronted with this medley of races? That is the problem of American nationalism. Millions of people thrown together, even if the unity of a state encompasses them all, do not yet make a nation. The strength of a nation lies in its organic unity. Only from this can that life-urge of the national totality arise which gives backbone and goal to a world policy.

While we face fixed national units as given factors of world-political tendencies in the states of Europe, we are still confronted in the United States with the question of whether such a unit will finish forming itself and

what character it will possess. Only the future will be able to answer this question. According to human judgment, sooner or later the common political atmosphere, the common school, the uniformity of external life, and the blood mixture will overcome all diverging tendencies. When, however, this development will be completed and what kind of nation the future one will be remains uncertain.

For now, the difficult problems and tasks with which this condition burdens American life counteract the single-mindedness of outwardly directed national willing.

The previous history of the United States' world-political ambitions can be summarized and surveyed in the history of the Monroe Doctrine. Its development and gradual transformation represent the development and gradual transformation of the political claims of the United States.

The origin of the Monroe Doctrine is a declaration by President Monroe from the year 1823. In 1823, the political situation of the American continent was as follows: Immense territories were still undeveloped, politically undelimited, and under uncertain governance. In the south, the Spanish colonies were fighting for their independence against Spain. In the far north, Russia sought to extend its rule over sterile Alaska toward fertile regions. By a treaty of 1818, England and the United States had postponed their disputes over the possession of yet undelimited territories in the north and agreed upon a ten-year condominium over these then little-known regions.

England and the United States jointly opposed Russian plans. At that time, Secretary of State Adams openly declared to the Russian minister in Washington, Baron Tuyl: "We shall contest Russia's right to any territorial establishment on this continent and openly establish the principle that the American continents are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for any new colonial settlement by European powers."

At the same time, Spain sought the intervention of the Holy Alliance against its revolting colonies. The treaty of November 20, 1815, obligated Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England to suppress all revolutionary

movements that peoples might undertake against legitimate governments. France had joined in 1818.

During Spain's diplomatic efforts with the powers of the Holy Alliance, President Monroe proclaimed in his annual message to Congress the principles that later received the name of the Monroe Doctrine. There are two principles: the principle of non-colonization and the principle of non-intervention. The first principle is set forth in Section 7 of the message and reads: "These circumstances offer a favorable occasion for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for colonization by any European power."

In Sections 48 and 49, the principle of non-intervention is justified as follows: "In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it consist with our policy to do so. But in regard to the events in this hemisphere we are necessarily more immediately connected. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. It is impossible that the allied states should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness. Nobody can believe that our southern brethren, left to themselves, would adopt a foreign intervention of their own accord. It is

therefore equally impossible that we should behold such intervention in any form with indifference."

Around these two principles, the political will of the new American nation crystallized. The President's message was received with immense jubilation in the United States. The ideal foundations of Americanism stood in contrast to the principles of the Holy Alliance. Hence, these few sentences became a political idea. The idea outlived the circumstances that prompted its formulation. The Holy Alliance no longer exists, nobody thinks anymore of the possibility of an intervention that could subject any part of the American continent to Europe's political system; the entire continent is colonized and partitioned, and the possibility of a new European colonization, against which Section 7 is directed, no longer exists. If one takes the Monroe Doctrine in its original formulation, it has become obsolete. As a political factor, its idea is more significant than ever.

It proved to be a pliable formula that managed to adapt itself in an astonishing way to the development of political feeling and desire. It absorbed everything that the United States could wish for up to the present day and lent to political action that effective and useful appearance of a legal principle which, supporting the political will invested in it, brought a powerful imponderable into the field against any external resistance. The formula became a political doctrine which, as the fixed and common content of political thinking, united the nation toward a single goal. It is flexible enough to endure changing interpretations, both to be applied in cases to which it does not fit and to be ignored in others to which it does. In the following decades, American policy tacitly expanded or, in changing practice, tacitly restricted the Monroe Doctrine. The general development, however, moved in the direction of constant expansion, though it must be said that this expansion, apart from political sentiment, could never dictate constant practice, but only occasional applications.

First, the Monroe Doctrine serves the American state to claim territories for itself whose conquest it denies to other states. Thus, the defensive character of the non-colonization principle passes into an offensive character. Europe should not only acquire no new colonies on American soil, but should

withdraw from its old ones. Already in the Venezuelan boundary dispute and the Cuba question, the principle had no other meaning. In an analogous manner, the principle of non-intervention turned its purely defensive meaning into an offensive one. While it was intended to ward off the intervention of the Holy Alliance, it ultimately became a legal principle meant to justify American intervention. The concept of intervention is so elastic that eventually any participation by European states in the political questions of Central and Middle America could fall under it; but completely eliminating Europe from the political questions of South and Central America means establishing an exclusive right of determination for the United States. Finally, the Monroe Doctrine is extended to the economic sphere, invoked to establish a tariff policy designed to drive European goods from the American continents and bind the South American states to the United States through a system of preferential tariffs. Today, the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine economically and politically is none other than the cry: America for the Americans; its actual meaning, however, is: all of America for the United States.

Only one idea of the Monroe Doctrine has not been expanded in the course of development, but rather restricted: that is the passage asserting the disinterest of the United States in non-American questions. That is, however, the only sentence that has a negative meaning. Accordingly, its restriction has a positive significance. To an increasing, albeit slowly growing extent, American politics has also occupied itself with European questions. Even though this change as yet has no significance, a new tendency can nevertheless be noted from it. It is entirely improbable that this tendency will attain any significance for European questions themselves in the foreseeable future. The task that is to be accomplished for the implementation of the expanded doctrine in America is too great, and the command of prudence—which, apart from any doctrine, must hold United States policy back from engaging in the European imbroglio—is too urgent for this tendency to run its course. As a tendency, however, it shows that the limitlessness of the will to power is not peculiar solely to the nationalisms of the old continents.

In the East Asian question, American politics is right in the thick of things. The United States has extended its rule to Hawaii and the Philippines—thus long ago exceeding the boundaries of the American continents eastward. The acquisition of the Philippines was already regarded by the "New York Herald" on May 6, 1898, as the acquisition of an excellent observation post from which the United States could intervene in a future partition of China.

The tendency and growth of American nationalism are thus clearly laid out. There remains a discussion of the means at its disposal. The United States has systematically expanded its fleet. Today, it possesses the third-strongest war fleet in the world. It requires this fleet not only for the sake of its East Asian interests, but as a backbone for its influence on the central and South American states. Against them, it has already been able to force its will on several occasions solely through maritime threats. In contrast, its land power is—measured against the political claims made by the expanded Monroe Doctrine—thoroughly inadequate. It is entirely questionable whether this land power would suffice for an intervention in Mexican unrest. Even less would it suffice for the practically impossible, yet theoretically conceivable case of a renewed European intervention in Mexico. From this arises a discrepancy between military power means and power claims that is essential to the distinctiveness of American politics.

Insofar as the program of the expanded Monroe Doctrine—America for the United States—has drawn ever closer to an ultimately impossible realization, it has not been through military power means that these advances have been made possible. They are solely economic forces. All influence of the United States in South America rests on its economic superiority, on the expansion of American capital. Its influence already predominates in Mexico and the small states of Central America, and competes with favorable prospects for hegemony against the capital powers of Europe in the South American states; and if any prospect exists for an effective domination of the American continents by the United States, it rests on the organizational talent of the American entrepreneur. In recent years, Americans have taken northern Argentine and southern Brazilian

railways into their hands and united them into a system. Political power follows economic power, which slowly undermines the former while maintaining the facade of an independent political front in order to operate undisturbed. It must be noted here that the national character of this capital power, though present, is partly questionable, and within this capital power a new, partly independent power has grown up that is not identical with the American nation and indeed competes with it for dominance at home.

Limits are set upon the expanded Monroe Doctrine. The first limit is military inadequacy. Economic superiority and the expansion of American capital may suffice to establish a great political influence of the United States on the South and Central American states. This influence in turn may suffice to convene pan-American congresses and also move South Americans to make pan-American speeches: it does not suffice for the founding of a unified pan-American giant empire. Pan-Americanism is countered by the rudimentary condition of the North American national type, the racial diversity of the Germanic North and the Latin South, and the growth of independent nationalisms in the South American states. If pan-Americanism is meant to signify the idea of a unified American nation, it is an empty word not only for today, but for all time.

9.

The other part of the American problem, the South American aspect, does not possess the same significance for an investigation of world-political factors, insofar as the South American states are currently, and will likely remain for a very long time, merely objects rather than subjects of world politics. They come into consideration for world-political interrelations only through the role they play in the world-political plans of other states. Their world-political activity currently still takes the form of passive resistance that they offer to such plans of others.

Of special significance is the stance they adopt toward the world politics of the United States on the one hand and that of the European great powers on the other. A French journalist in 1896 polled the envoys of the South American states in Paris regarding their opinions on the Monroe Doctrine

and published the responses in the "Temps" of January 1, 1896. The essential meaning of all these answers is this: The independence of the American states is a matter of course. The Monroe Doctrine is not a legal principle, but a legal claim of the United States. America for the Americans, but not for the United States. The autonomy of the viable states of South America and their will to preserve this independence against the United States has grown continuously in recent decades and will, in all probability, grow further. The economic influence of North American capital may grow, and by virtue of this economic influence, the weak Central American states may long since have fallen into a real dependence on the United States: they too strive to maintain appearances and here and there offer resistance to the political plans of the United States as best and as long as they can. The intervention attempts of the United States, even where they served the interest of the state—as in Venezuela—and were initially greeted with jubilation, have ultimately left behind mistrust and unrest. Brazil has made many concessions to pan-American ideas in the economic sphere and, because of its antagonism toward Argentina, has reason to seek close attachment to the United States; once this antagonism can be leveled out and American friendship becomes more demanding, Brazil will quickly join with Argentina and the other states against the power claims of the United States. Matters stand today such that any stronger pressure from the north must bring about the unification of the south.

Signs of this development have multiplied in recent decades, and no amount of pan-American pageantry can obscure them. Slavs are bound by a common race, for the most part also a common religious faith: therefore, panslavism—even though its most essential political content is the Russian claim to rule over all Slavs—will always remain a reality because a genuine idea underlies it and there is something upon which the Russian power claim can lean. Pan-Americanism, however, is neither a reality nor a genuine idea, but a phantom: it is a power claim of the North Americans, and there is nothing in the hearts of South Americans upon which it could rest. The population of the United States is separated from the population of the southern parts of the American continents by the greatest

conceivable racial difference, which is underscored especially by the partly Indigenous type of the neighboring Mexican population. The racial opposition coincides with the diversity of languages. And this racial opposition is moreover not exhausted by the contrast between the Romance and Germanic races. It has been sharpened by the different relationship of both races to the native Indians. Whereas in the north there was no intermixture; rather, the Indigenous population perished, it has been preserved in the south and at least partially absorbed, thereby adding a new separating element to those already existing.

If the South and North American states were bound by a common danger facing Europe, a common interest might perhaps give pan-Americanism some footing. That is, however, no longer, or has long ceased to be, the case. Attempts are indeed made from time to time to fabricate such a danger—for which, for example, German immigration in Brazil has had to serve; but such attempts are too insufficiently grounded to make any lasting impression.

Regarding the relationship of the South American states to Europe, they know precisely that no political danger threatens them from that quarter. For the political expansion of the nations driving world politics, South America plays no role. Nobody in Europe thinks of territorial acquisitions on American soil anymore. Insofar as the world-political competition of European nations is political, it remains restricted to the African and Asian continents. In this competition, the South American states, which have nothing to seek in Africa and will remain far from the East Asian conflict zone for a long time, are nowhere entangled. Modern world politics, however, has an economic and a cultural side whose significance for the general goals of world politics does not lag behind the political, and in this economic and cultural competitive struggle of the great European nations, South America plays a main role. Argentina can financially be considered a colony directed from the London Stock Exchange. In its imports, England stands at the very top, while Germany and the United States vie for second place; France, which has placed the focal point of its world-political propaganda on culture because it can secure a share of its economy solely

through cultural predominance, controls South America's news supply from Europe, fashion, taste, phrases, and literature, sends throngs of lecturers, and so forth.

The South American states have no reason to hinder this economic struggle of the European nations, which plays out on their soil; they develop thereby, grow rich, and feel protected against the danger of economic subjugation by the United States. The capital that Europe invests in the virgin soil of South America takes nothing from the inhabitants of this soil, but rather fertilizes it and lets them participate in a multiplied yield, of which only a small part flows back to Europe as interest.

The larger of the South American states have strengthened considerably as states in the past decade. In some, the era of eternal revolutions is over; in others, revolution has only the significance of a change of government. In the north, state consolidation is less advanced than in the south. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have done much for their army and navy; they have ships of the latest type, well-equipped armies, partly trained by European instructors. These armaments, although primarily provoked by the antagonism of these states among themselves, are nevertheless an important factor for the power claims of the United States: the Argentine army is today undoubtedly superior to that of the United States, and if the states show themselves so restrained regarding Mexican unrest, this attitude has certainly involved the recognition that the federal army is hardly equal to the task of pacifying a country so shaken today.

Faster even than states of formidable power, nations with a strong will to live and inner individuality have grown up in South America. They are still in the process of formation, but the types are already beginning to stand out sharply from one another. Which factors are effective in this development process—the environment, different nuances of racial mixing, or the influence of state conditions—is irrelevant in this context; suffice it to establish that the fundamental national tendency that binds individuals to peoples has also seized South America and increasingly dominates it.

10.

If we have hitherto had to note an increase in national tendencies everywhere in the consideration of individual folk-individualities and their political distinctiveness, these were nonetheless throughout peoples of the white race, children of Europe, and components of the Christian cultural sphere. That this strengthening of national tendencies flows not from the peculiar nature of the white race or Christian European cultural spheres, but from human nature itself, is taught by the consideration of the two nations of the yellow race, one of which with unprecedented activity, the other with a still passive, yet enormous mass, have begun to intervene in world-political events.

Japan has transformed itself in the course of half a century from a medievally backward state structure—isolated from all the world, fragmented in civil wars and nobility struggles—into a modern great power. Only in the year 1858 did it conclude the first trade treaty that opened a series of ports to the United States, and only ten years later, after fierce internal struggles provoked precisely by this change in the isolation policy against foreigners, did it finally abandon isolation and enter into free contact with the Euro-American world. The development that then took place is unique in recorded history. The Japanese showed themselves capable of acquiring the power means of European civilization in the course of a few decades and transforming their economic and political organization according to the model of Europe. The astonishing thing here is that through such a rapid transformation of all life, the national organism was not internally shaken and weakened, as in all other cases where a previously isolated people suddenly adopted a foreign culture, ideological world, and economic organization. Japan even succeeded in using European power means against Europe itself and with success: after it had defeated China, it pushed Russia back from the Japanese expansion area in a victorious war under brilliant, much-admired military exploits, thereby stepping into the ranks of world powers not quite four decades after it had opened itself to modern civilization. The external course of this development is known, but the internal factors that made it possible are difficult to grasp. They interest

us here insofar as they enable a judgment of the Japan of today, the driving forces of its imperialism, and its future.

These internal reasons can be sought nowhere else than in the distinctiveness of the Japanese race and, alongside the cohesiveness and unity of this race and its culture, alongside the relative smallness of the country—which facilitates transformability and enables a thorough and rapid effect of state measures—the old military traits of the Japanese, their docility, flexibility, and stubborn energy can be drawn upon for explanation. The essential thing is to be sought in the quality of the race, the elemental will to live of the nation, in short, the power of the national tendency. From the moment the Japanese people—whose unconscious nationalism had hitherto found satisfaction in isolation and hostility against everything foreign—began to comprehend that it was thereby endangering its existence, it threw itself with the same passion with which it had previously rejected everything foreign into its imitation: and against this recognition of practical necessity, all traditions, dogmas, hesitations, and ideas opposing such an upheaval vanished in an astonishingly short time. It is a people whose will to live is oriented in a highly real way, subordinating everything else to the real pursuit of power. This direction of the will to live, its cohesiveness, and its strength have enabled the rapid rise of small Japan to an imperialistically oriented world power. Today's Japanese nationalism differs little from European nationalism. It may still have been essentially Asian in the period of isolation; today it is likewise Europeanized.

As is known, this nationalism has been directed outward from the very beginning. Soon after its emergence, it was imperialistic and expansive. Japan rules today over new acquisitions including Korea, the Liaotung Peninsula, Formosa, the island of Sakhalin up to the 50th parallel; southern Manchuria is a scarcely contested domain of its influence. For the small and poor country, this means enormous expansion. All of this it has conquered through the sword and rules through the sword. It is known what fears this rapid Japanese expansion has evoked all around the coasts of the Pacific, in Australia, California, and Mexico. Even the United States feels threatened

not only in the possession of the Philippines and Hawaii, but on the American mainland itself, and many already see the Japanese gaining a foothold in Mexico, California, Ecuador, and establishing coaling stations and naval bases. All these fears are nourished by the peculiarity of the Japanese emigrant, his diligence, tenacity, labor power, and limitless patriotism. This type of emigrant carries the homeland with him, which he has turned his back on. There is no doubt that these fears are exaggerated. It has already become clearer in recent years that expansive development will at least have to slow its pace and has already slowed it. Today's Japan suffers from its successes.

It was perhaps forced to pursue such an extravagant foreign policy, notably not to tolerate Russian plans on its best expansion area, but it has not yet overcome the consequences of its victories. It must consolidate itself economically and financially in a completely different way before it can even think of a small part of the ambition attributed to it. Premature growth may indeed lead to external successes, also perhaps to the foundation of an empire whose power and expanse can be admired on the map—but a real and enduring rule requires a different foundation. With this, however, we come to the main weakness of today's, perhaps also the future, Japanese imperialism. The Japanese people have achieved their successes through their warlike properties. Its imperialism is an imperialism of force. In our time's exceedingly complex interrelations and living conditions, however, force alone cannot hold what it acquired. True imperialism, which not only outwardly rules what is acquired, but internally appropriates it, presupposes a multitude of capabilities that have nothing to do with the use of the sword. Everything Japan has done so far in the governance of newly acquired regions of foreign race in Korea and Formosa does not justify the belief that it possesses these properties. It has the appearance as though something indispensable were lacking: cultural, religious power. It is strange, but undeniable, that not the founding, but the enduring preservation of great empires has been the work of an idea. Japan has no such idea. It brings to the world no new religion, no new idealism, no new ideal of humanity that would seduce others to itself. Japanese

imperialism lacks religious grounding. Perhaps this reveals the reverse side of its Europeanization. It seems as though it had nothing more new, original to say to the world—only Japanese nuances of opinions of Europe, which would remain as before the mother of ideas. Perhaps the future will disavow this opinion, which was pronounced by English connoisseurs of Japan who, as Englishmen, know best about the cultural preconditions of imperialism.

11.

The other East Asian power, China, cannot yet engage in world politics. It is currently only an object, not a subject, of world politics, but of all objects the largest, strangest, most obscure. It is the largest not only because of the immense space, its wealth of mineral resources, and its fertility—but primarily because of the unprecedented mass of human beings. China counts four hundred million inhabitants. Human beings, however, are the greatest wealth. Moreover, these four hundred million have a fecundity unmatched elsewhere. If the Chinese problem is incomparable in quantitative terms, it is even more so qualitatively. It is of such an unapproachable distinctiveness and complexity that anyone not gifted with the ability to judge and synthesize straightforwardly and without self-scrutiny must modestly confess his incompetence. Connoisseurs of China have noted that the problem always appears more multifaceted and elusive the more one occupies oneself with it in the country itself. Then, however, it is presumptuous to believe one can draw its contours from afar in brief strokes. No such claim is raised here. Only a few moments that appear significant for the general problem of the national tendency are to be singled out, while touching with all reservation upon the possibilities that the Chinese problem offers to the development of modern world politics.

There is no doubt that modern China also has its national tendency. A number of expressions of this tendency are already evident: boycott movements, party programs, and the press, which has also emerged in China over the past decade. Typical though these expressions are, they do not justify thinking of this mass of four hundred million people as nationally

determined and consolidated in the same sense in which the peoples of the Euro-American ideological sphere, to which modern Japan already belongs, are. One must always consider that the movement that has seized the Chinese people in the past decade encompasses only a fraction of the four hundred million, namely the one that has come into closer relationship with Europe, while by far the greatest part persists in the bonds of old China, perhaps having gained no knowledge or only a completely false knowledge of all the changes and upheavals of recent years. Old China is still always the main factor of the modern one.

Old China, however, was not a national empire in the modern sense. It was accustomed to foreign rule through centuries. Warlike peoples from the north broke again and again into the industriously and quietly tilled, fruitful empire, seized power, were gradually overcome by the superior culture of the ruled. The Chinese people accepted this fate as the will of God. God reveals Himself through success. Whoever had success was the one blessed by God, "treated as the son of God," the Son of Heaven—even if he was a stranger. If the ruling dynasty had failures, if the people under its rule were visited by flood, famine, pestilence, that was a sign that Heaven had withdrawn its grace from it, so it was permitted to be overthrown. The people's misfortune was the fault of the rulers. The change of the throne through revolution was an institution.

The national thought is far from this world of ideas. It is a kind of universal monarchy that clings to success, in which the people have no share, in which the ruler is obligated to make the people happy and sins when the people become unhappy. Thereby the rulers are overthrown because they are no good, not because they are foreign conquerors. Added to this is the ideal foundation of Confucianism. Confucianism is the strictest contrast to the modern Euro-American world of ideas, to its individualism, its restless, boundless drive for life, its belief in an infinite goal, its longing for ever-new things. For the Confucian, the thinkers and statesmen of the oldest Chinese history have already thought everything thinkable, found all wisdom, measured all boundaries. It is only a matter of preserving their tradition, holding fast to their institutions, exploring their wisdom, and

ensuring that everything remains as it is or becomes again what it was. On this basis, there is no modern nationalism. That seeks the eternal new, is always dissatisfied, directed into the future, wants to grow limitlessly, rejects the past, and regards the present as a step of a better future. For old China, our world must be just as incomprehensible as a state of petrification is to us, in which the philologists, the best connoisseurs of the old writings and their style, are regarded as the appointed state officials and the political career is opened through philological examinations.

Naturally, the Chinese also have their patriotism, their love of home. But that is not yet national. It is locally oriented in China, clings to the province and not to the empire, which lies beyond patriotism as a universal empire. This provincial patriotism is an undeniable factor that has proved more centrifugal than centripetal in the struggles of recent years.

This immense mass so disposed has now come into contact with the Euro-American civilization and thereby slowly come into motion. What a shudder must have gone through this world when Emperor Guangxu in 1898 resolved upon an edict in which it was stated: "Knowledge of the classics alone does not yet qualify one for holding an important office. More important today is that someone knows the world." We single out this inconspicuous remark from all the details of the Chinese reformation and revolution because it reveals in a brief and simple way the grandiose tragedy of old China. If it simply were a matter of putting a better new in place of a worse old! But we Europeans must not forget that the educated Chinese has a certain right to doubt that the old is a worse, the new a better, that for him the Euro-American state of mind is something inferior, something China has already overcome millennia ago—that it seems to him as though the ancient Chinese sages answer the European's impetuous questions with a superior smile—with an answer very old, somewhat weary, but very wise. Europe knows no final conclusion of wisdom, China believes it has possessed it since antiquity. Japan did not possess such a spiritual culture, what it possessed of it was of Chinese origin—hence the Japanese transformation concerns a mere changeover, while the Chinese transformation is a tragedy on the grandest scale.

Today's China is a republic, has a constitution, a parliament, a president, a cabinet, parties, newspapers, railways, and so forth. All of this is the result of a few years. The development is in full swing, a turning back impossible. And yet it would be wrong to conclude from this that the tragedy is concluded, the problem solved. China has the form, but not yet the essence. Of the four hundred million, only a few have been set into motion. The question that concerns us here is not yet answered: it is the question whether out of the immense empire, after the seemingly inevitable loss of the outer provinces, a viable national state in the European sense, thus a Chinese nation that can be not only an object, but also a subject of world politics, will emerge, or whether patriotism will remain a provincial phenomenon and the immense empire, incapable of pulsing and living as a whole in the European sense, will split apart, with its provinces maintaining a tolerable degree of independence for a time before eventually falling piecemeal to Euro-American-Japanese expansion?

This question is still so unanswerable today that under all reservations any answer would be presumption. It appears as though a modern nationalism wants to develop. The impression made by foreign culture has created it. But it is born of negation, behaves initially as hostility against the foreign, is passive and negative, and wherever it is, it seems to cling to the provinces. For decades, China will remain an object of world politics for the powers interested in the East—an immense object, tolerably protected against political expansion by the rivalry of the aspirants and the fundamentally economic nature of their interests. But if it should once become a national state in our sense, with the limitless life-urge of such a state, then with its human masses and riches, the industry, the frugality, skill of its inhabitants, it will carry the seed of immense possibilities within itself.

Having attempted to sketch the distinctive national tendencies that dominate today's world politics, there remains for us the task of posing a general question that is of greatest significance for the political development of the future, but admittedly scarcely answerable. If it is true that the national tendencies are everywhere growing, how does it stand then with the possibility of the new formation of nations, the division of existing

ones? The currently existing nations once originated. Will new ones also arise in the future or is today's system of nations relatively persistent? It is clear that this moment determines the probabilities of the future.

This, of course, involves estimating factors that are scarcely accessible to human judgment. Nothing is as obscure as the origin of nations. Our age seems so thoroughly determined by national identities that new formations are unlikely. Where new national movements have arisen, it is only a matter of an awakening of old national connections, not a development of new ones. When peoples like the Flemings, Bulgarians, Arabs become conscious of their national belonging, that is an awakening. The emergence of the youngest nations, the South American ones, still falls into the time before the beginning of the general national movement. We have seen how strongly the formation of the North American nation is hindered by the national identities of later immigrants. In the two great world empires in which a division into different peoples is conceivable at all, Russia and the British Empire, we have no sign whatsoever that the differences of the parts are enlarging, that the national tendency is taking a particularistic turn. On the contrary, the tendency seems to be to develop each group's particular distinctiveness while stripping it of any centrifugal impulse, and at the same time strengthening the attraction of the larger framework. Thus we are inclined to assume that our age favors the revival of old nations but is fundamentally determined against the emergence of new ones. Thus, we regard the existing nations as given factors and leave the conceivability of new formations out of account.